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Despite sustained focus on lawyers' ethics in contemporary practice,'
teaching2 and scholarship,3 there is still much dissatisfaction with lawyers'
ethics. There are many causes of this dissatisfaction, including a decline in
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1. See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982)
(providing a systematic character study of the Chicago Bar); F. ZEMANS & V. ROSENBLUM, THE
MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981) (examining law school's role in development of lawyers and
legal profession); Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and
Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (1985) [hereinafter R. Nelson]
(examining relationship between practice in large firms and their political, legal, and professional
attitudes).
2. See generally ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AM. BAR
ASSOC., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE
OF THE LAW SCHOOLS (1979); ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, AM.
BAR AssoC., LAW SCHOOLS AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (1980); E. Gordon Gee & Donald W.
Jackson, Current Studies of Legal Education: Findings and Recommendations, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471
(1982); Elizabeth D. Gee, Legal Ethics Education and the Dynamics of Reform, 31 CATH. LAW. 203
(1987); Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of Law Students'
Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1991)
(studying effects of law office work on the formation of students' professional values); Ronald M.
Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 247; Teaching Legal Ethics: A Symposium, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1991) (offering
perspectives on the content and process of legal ethics instruction).
3. For a sampling of the leading literature, see generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977) [hereinafter Morgan, Evolving]; Stephen L.
Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613 [hereinafter Pepper, Ethical Role]; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on
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lawyer professionalism apparent to many4 and lawyers' failure to adhere to
fundamental ethical or social norms. Additionally, the increased commer-
cialism of law practice, notably evident in the 1980s, has elevated the
demands of practice and, concomitantly, reinforced lawyers' predisposition
to prefer their own and especially their clients' interests over other obliga-
tions central to the professional role.
Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) [hereinafter Simon, Discretion].
4. There is a widespread perception that current law practice has become too commercial,
becoming "more like a trade than a profession, with an emphasis on money and profit rather than on
service and justice." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine; The
Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1991). There is a
"collapse of professionalism ... currently developing in practice." Id. at 1239; accord Morris
Harrell, Preserving Professionalism, 69 A.B.A. J. 864 (1983) ("the practice of law [is] becom[ing] just
another business"); Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV.
311, 331 (1990) ("lawyers are professionals, supposedly wedded to the idea that service to the public
comes before their own monetary gain"). Professor Morgan has noted that
we as lawyers seem to be losing a sense of ourselves as trustees of a tradition of justice, a
tradition which is important in preserving a sense of-social unity .... I believe that it is
because of lawyers' preoccupation with the desires of the client, to the exclusion of all else,
that lawyers have been experiencing a period of decline in professionalism - a decline
which has been going on for at least fifteen or twenty years.
Thomas D. Morgan, The Fall and Rise of Professionalism, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 451, 452 (1985)
[hereinafter Morgan, Professionalism]. Professor Morgan attributes the decline in professionalism
to a number of sources: "the rights revolution of the 1960s," id. at 457; "the growth in the number of
lawyers," id. at 458; "that the rewards of success today are so high for the really successful
practitioners that there is very little incentive to invest one's time in issues that transcend the private
client," id. at 459; and that "the financial pressures in the practice of law today are such that one
often cannot afford to look beyond the short-range and the practical." Id. at 460. These concerns
seem particularly legitimate when even the American Bar Association (ABA) condemns widespread
commercialism in the legal profession. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR Assoc., REPORT
TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243,
251 (1986) (asking whether profession has "abandoned principle for profit").
On the other hand, it may simply be a myth "that the professions embody a long tradition of
professional training, self-regulation, and dedication to public service.... [T]he 'golden age of
professionalism' may never have existed." Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 773, 782. Indeed, at the turn of the century, Louis Brandeis observed: "Able
lawyers have, to a large extent, allowed themselves to become adjuncts of great corporations and
have neglected the obligation to use their powers for the protection of the people." Louis D.
BRANDEIS, BUSINESS - A PROFESSION 321 (1914). Still, "much might be gained if we look at the
'nobility' of our profession and its 'traditional preference for the welfare of others over self' as a
beautiful myth ... understood to be [a] metaphor... [for] express[ing] truth." Michael Distelhorst,
Living in the Faith of Our Special Myths, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 1135, 1141 (1990). "Let us continue to
live in the faith of our special myth as we continue to aspire to our 'historic' ideals." Id. at 1144.
5. Studies involving broad segments of the lawyer population, ranging from large corporate
practice to small firms and solo practitioners, indicate that attorneys strive to maximize their clients'
self-interest and, in the process, take on the values of their clients. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 1,
at 360-65 (1982); John P. Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REV. 891, 898-99, 911 (1983); R.
Nelson, supra note 1, at 505, 538. In an earlier article, the present author spoke of the "congruence
of values between attorneys and their clients" and how this causes an undervaluation of ethical
questions. Edward J. Eberle, Toward Moral Responsibility in Lawyering: Further Thoughts on the
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This article contends that the current dissatisfaction over legal ethics can
be traced, in part, to a more fundamental confusion in lawyers' thinking
about the practice of law.6 As professionals, lawyers owe duties to clients,
society, and conscience. These duties are part of broader conceptions of
autonomy, community, and morality.7 These conceptions form the founda-
tions of law practice, supplying the reasons for acting in the capacity of a
lawyer. However, lawyers are confused as to how to balance these founda-
tions, and how to reason properly from them. Lawyers tend to overempha-
size client autonomy interests to the detriment of relevant community or
morality interests.8
Deontological Model of Legal Ethics, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) [hereinafter Eberle, Moral
Responsibility]. See also Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV.
741, 741-42 (1988) (observing decline of public-spiritedness by lawyers and increasing willingness to
promote client interests without regard to competing interests).
These issues are critical to the legal profession. Clients' dominance of lawyers robs lawyers of
their independence. This may effect who sets the standards of the profession. Indeed, lawyers may
themselves lack the power or the will to set the standards for the profession. "In sum, the influence
of client interests may threaten the profession's coherence and identity." John P. Heinz & Edward
0. Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76
MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1142 (1978). Additionally, "[i]f lawyers do not moderate the tendencies of
clients to extract the maximum advantage from the legal system, we can expect legal outcomes to
become increasingly skewed in favor of resourceful parties, thus undermining the legitimacy of legal
institutions." R. Nelson, supra note 1, at 508.
6. Professor William E. Nelson agrees that "lawyers face a crisis in thought about ethical issues"
but that most analyses of professional standards erroneously assume "a single, coherent set of ideas
derived from the adversary system of adjudication." William E. Nelson, Moral Ethics, Adversary
Justice, and Political Theory: Three Foundations for the Law of Professional Responsibility, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 911, 911 (1989) [hereinafter W. Nelson]. In contrast, Nelson posits that ethical issues
are complicated, implicating "at least three different and unrelated conceptional approaches." Id.
at 912. These are moral ethics, adversary systemic values, and political values. Id. "[l]t is no wonder
that confusion abounds when the complexity is not even appreciated." Id. Of course, "[t]he
demands of practice itself and changing social, economic, political, and moral forces cause immense
confusion." Lawry, supra note 4, at 313.
7. The preamble to the 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct explains these duties as follows:
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice.... A lawyer's responsibilities as a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen are usually
harmonious.... In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system, and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining
an upright person while earning a satisfactory living.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
8. This reflects the dominant view of the profession that duties owed clients eclipse those owed
society or conscience. See, e.g., Lawry, supra note 4, at 332 n.146 (characterizing the belief that "[a]
lawyer's primary obligation, loyalty and responsibility must be to his client" as "the obsessive
client-centered approach to the Code and to the vocation of lawyering."). See also authorities cited
supra note 5. Of course, "complex economic, social, and ideological dynamics are responsible for
lawyers sharing clients' interests, and it is a mischaracterization of the range of forces at work to
attribute this mutual self-interest to the 'lawyers' feeble moral fiber or crass material preoccupation.' "
Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 7 (footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, the dominant view
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The purpose of this article, therefore, is to clarify the central conceptions
of the profession as a way of sharpening thinking about ethics. 9 Certainly
the autonomy, community, and morality foundations are significant, gener-
ate a rich set of reasons to act, and have an important range of applications
to legal ethics. While these foundations both relate to and differ from one
another, much writing on legal ethics has emphasized their differences.'
What is needed now, however, is a focus on their interrelationships. By
connecting these foundations, more clarity and conceptual coherence may
be brought to legal ethics. Lawyers can then look to a more coherent
framework for reasoning and providing advice and ethical guidance to their
clients. In this way, the current sense of confusion in lawyers' thinking about
ethics can be ameliorated.
To accomplish these objectives, the article examines briefly, in Part I, the
strengths and limitations of each foundation. While each foundation is
runs counter to the central conceptions of the professional role, as traditionally expressed, see, e.g.,
ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIOUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953) (defining profession as
"a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public service") or as
presently codified in the Model Rules. See supra note 7. See also Rhode, supra note 3, at 629 ("Much
of what is problematic in legal practice springs not from venality but from factual or normative un-
certainty, together with a tendency to resolve all possible doubts in a single, client-oriented direc-
tion. That tendency arises from a complex set of social and ideological as well as economic concerns.").
9. "To meet the highest demands of professional responsibility the lawyer must not only have a
clear understanding of his duties, but must also possess the resolution necessary to carry into effect
what his intellect tells him ought to be done." Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional
Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958) [hereinafter Joint
Report].
10. In the rich tradition of legal ethics that has arisen, most scholars have emphasized one of the
three foundations over the others. Prominent proponents of an autonomy model of legal ethics
include: Monroe Freedman, see FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 50 ("Once the lawyer has chosen to
accept responsibility to represent a client, however, the zealousness of that representation cannot
be tempered by the lawyer's moral judgments of the client or of the client's cause."); Charles Fried,
see Fried, supra note 3, at 1066 ("[lit is not only legally but also morally right that a lawyer adopts as
his dominant purpose the furthering of his client's interests."); and Stephen Pepper. See Pepper,
Ethical Role, supra note 3, at 618, 634 ("[T]he client's conscience should be superior to the lawyer's
... the professional must subordinate his interest to the client's when there is a conflict.").
The most prominent communitarian in legal ethics is Thomas Shaffer. See generally THOMAS L.
SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TopiCS (1985) [hereinafter
SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS] (offering images for people to aspire to or emulate) ; Thomas
L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 965 n.8 (1987)
[hereinafter Shaffer, Radical Individualism] (arguing that it is desirable to achieve an organic
community, one "created by people through the mutual practice of the virtues, and through mutual
support in the pursuit of the good.").
Those preferring moral concerns over the others include David Luban, see DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 159 (1988) ("[R]ules [should] be redrafted to allow
lawyers to forego immoral tactics or the pursuit of unjust ends without withdrawing, even if their
clients insist that they use these tactics or pursue these ends."); William Simon, see Simon,
Discretion, supra note 3, at 1083 ("Lawyers should have ethical discretion to refuse to assist in the
pursuit of legally permissible courses of action and in the assertion of potentially enforceable legal
claims.").
THREE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL ETHICS
important, each captures only part of the professional lawyering role.
Accordingly, lawyers should look at clients and their legal problems in a
more complete way, considering all aspects of a problem, rather than
relying exclusively on ideas drawn from any one foundation.
Part II highlights the connections among the foundations in order to
imbue the profession with more conceptual coherence. In this way, a sound
framework is established to apply to the demands of concrete cases.
Nevertheless, even application of this integrated approach to legal ethics
will not necessarily generate solutions to all questions of professional
responsibility. Ethical questions are complicated. Their solution calls for
hard-headed, critical reasoning and prudential judgment, involving the best
of our reasoning capabilities. That task requires talents no less demanding
than any other legal questions," as Part III illustrates in relation to two
central questions of legal ethics - subornation of perjury in criminal cases
and the resolution of problematic moral dilemmas where duties to client,
community, and conscience seem unresolvable.
I. THE STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF EACH FOUNDATION
Legal ethics consists of at least three conceptual foundations, those of
autonomy, community, and morality.' 2 Each of these provides important
reasons for attorneys to act. The autonomy foundation, described in Part
II.A. is client-centered, emphasizing lawyers' fidelity to clients in helping
them achieve their due in society. 13 By contrast, the community foundation,
described in Part II.B. highlights the importance of lawyers' character and
obligations to community, including the courts and system of law. 4 The
morality foundation, described in Part II.C. emphasizes the pursuit of
11. "[Tihe task of deciding professional responsibility questions becomes as complex as that of
deciding any other legal question, and it is no wonder that confusion abounds when the complexity is
not even appreciated." W. Nelson, supra note 6, at 912.
12. There are other conceptual approaches to legal ethics. For example, Professor William
Nelson views professional responsibility as implicating at least three different and unrelated
conceptual approaches: moral ethics, adversary systemic values, and political values. W. Nelson,
supra note 6, at 912.
Professor Freedman, on the other hand, "think[s] of lawyers' ethics as rooted in the Bill of Rights
as expressed in our constitutionalized adversary system." Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical
Means, 41 J. LEGAL EDuc. 55, 55-56 (1991) [hereinafter Freedman, Ethical Ends]. His view is
"client-centered, emphasizing the lawyer's role in enhancing the client's autonomy as a free person
in a free society." Id. at 56. While emphasizing client "autonomy" aspects of professional
responsibility, Professor Freedman is also concerned about the lawyer's autonomy and the clients'
and attorneys' own morality. Id. at 55 n.6. See also Edwin H. Greenbaum, Attorneys' Problems in
Making Ethical Decisions, 52 IND. L.J. 627 (1977) (finding a client-oriented and public interest model
running through legal ethics literature).
13. See infra notes 31-97 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 98-124 and accompanying text.
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ethical ends by ethical means as a foundation for all conduct, including
professional practice.
1 5
In this way, each foundation captures a part of the professional lawyering
role, reflecting key attributes of legal ethics. Autonomy speaks to lawyers'
duties to clients; community addresses lawyers' duties to others and,
collectively, to society; morality addresses lawyers duties to conscience.
Each foundation thereby implicates somebody or something important
beyond the lawyer - autonomy implicates concrete others, individual or
corporate clients; community addresses the larger human society and its
system of law; morality bespeaks an accountability to certain ethical ideals.
Nevertheless, while each foundation is useful and has an important range
of applications, no one foundation alone is fully coherent, able to generate
satisfactory answers to all questions of professional responsibility., 6 Ethical
problems are complicated, often involving a matrix of ideas, principles, or
interests. In this way, questions of professional responsibility reflect the
demands, diversity, and dynamics of life, as do other legal questions.
Yet, for these reasons, it seems more fruitful to address professional
responsibility by drawing upon all three foundations of legal ethics rather
15. See infra notes 125-180 and accompanying text.
16. Each foundation poses complex theoretical and practical difficulties. The autonomy founda-
tion, for example, raises complex questions as to its reach. At what point do other claims trump
client interests? Given a lawyer's promise of confidentiality, for example, should the lawyer breach
that promise and disclose a client's admission of past harm, ongoing harm, or intention to commit
harm to appropriate persons outside the attorney-client relationship? These are serious questions
which test the limits of reliance on autonomy as a foundation. They also raise important practical
problems, such as, how to maintain confidentiality in the face of threatened harms, or alternatively,
how to disclose in these circumstances without compromising one's client.
Likewise, the community foundation raises difficult issues. As a foundational theory, communitari-
anism must develop reliable institutions, concepts, and regimes to protect community without
sacrificing individual rights and minority interests. Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community, and
Lawyers' Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 939, 944, 962-63 (1990) [hereinafter Pepper, Autonomy]. More
practically, in the face of conflicts of competing values, should ultimate duties be owed to moral
ideals, client interests, or community norms? For example, in representing a criminal defendant
who has confessed his guilt, does one now disclose this out of a sense of duty to community, either to
enforce compliance with the law society has established to punish those guilty of crimes or to protect
societal members from future threats of harm posed by this defendant? Or does one remain silent
and zealously represent the client in order to uphold the concept of due process of law, itself a
foundational norm. Resolving these tensions between individuals and community calls for careful
judgment.
Morality has limitations as a foundation for legal ethics as well. Not all professional questions
raise moral issues. A dominant concept in our legal system, zealous representation, for example, is
not usefully informed in any degree of specificity by fundamental ethical values that can solve
satisfactorily concrete problems. Certainly moral concepts of loyalty and confidentiality underlie
this duty. Nevertheless, these concepts do not address usefully what duties are owed to interests
other than one's client. For example, what duties are owed to adverse parties, or to opposing
counsel? Are there obligations to point out the weakness of their case, whether in arguments used,
evidence put forth, or precedents relied upon or overlooked. These questions are more ones of
professional etiquette than of ethics.
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than relying exclusively on any one. Indeed, to the extent solutions are
sought only through reliance on any single foundation, thinking tends to
become distorted. The urge to fit solutions into preordained patterns of
thought too easily results in cases being compromised to achieve symmetry
with such patterns. While there is virtue in simplifying thinking, overreli-
ance on such thinking can be too limiting, becoming its own straightjacket if
not scrutinized.
Lawyers' propensity to maximize client interests, even to the detriment of
relevant social or moral interests, is an example of such one-dimensional
thinking.1 7 For example, consider the conduct of lawyers at the Wall Street
law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell in Beiny v. Wynyard.'8 Desiring privileged
information in the hands of a nonparty, the liquidator of a defunct law firm
that previously represented the trust then being disputed, the lawyers
subpoenaed the liquidator for the information with notice of a deposition,
but no notice was rendered to the other parties in the dispute. Upon
request, the lawyers also assured the liquidator that the files requested
would be made available to opposing counsel in the dispute, but this also
was not done. Sullivan & Cromwell's cover letter requesting the documents
also misrepresented that they represented the executor of the will when, in
fact, the will had not yet been offered for probate.
Once the materials were turned over, Sullivan & Cromwell cancelled the
deposition. With the deposition cancelled, the lawyers argued that it no
longer was necessary to comply with notice requirements. They then used
information obtained from the subpoenaed documents to surprise the
opposing party, the trustee of the estate, at her deposition.' 9
The court concluded that the lawyers cleverly abused the system, "chart-
[ing] a course which [they] knew to be at variance with acceptable discovery
practice so as to obtain by stealth that which could not be readily obtained
through proper channels." 20 "Not only were the rules flaunted, but Sullivan
& Cromwell repeatedly lied in order to carry out its hardball strategy."2"
Worse, the lawyers "saw nothing wrong with anything they did; they showed
no embarrassment over their wrongdoing; and they defended themselves to
the bitter end.",22
Beiny is representative of the "obsessive, client-centered approach" to
lawyering that contributes to the current dissatisfaction with lawyers eth-
17. See supra notes 5 and 8 and accompanying text. Indeed, "particularly under competitive
circumstances, the likelihood of ethical tunnel vision increases." Rhode, supra note 3, at 627.
18. 517 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
19. Id. at 476.
20. Id. at 478. The firm was ultimately disqualified from further representation in the matter. Id.
21. Lawry, supra note 4, at 324.
22. Id. at 326.
1993]
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iCS. 2 3 This approach is the product of distorted thinking, overemphasizing
client autonomy interests to the detriment of relevant community or moral
interests. It is a mistake to view legal ethics solely from the standpoint only
of promoting the client's cause.
In place of such tunnel-vision, proper ethical thinking should fairly take
into account the range of considerations implicated in cases. For example,
in Beiny, lawyers' duties to uphold the integrity of the legal system require
them to obey rules for rendering proper notice, including to adverse parties,
in making discovery requests, as part of an orderly and fair process for
discovering information. 24 Duties to conscience should have prevented the
deliberate lies and misrepresentations. In this way, client autonomy inter-
ests could properly be promoted within relevant social and moral con-
straints.
In unpacking the conceptual confusion underlying the practice of law, it is
crucial to recognize squarely the several foundations which apply to legal
ethics. It is a mistake to view the discipline through the lens of only a single
foundation, as the lawyers in Beiny saw only their client's autonomy inter-
ests. Instead, lawyers should derive reasons for acting from all three
foundations. These reasons will not necessarily be mutually incompatible.
In fact, they may reinforce one another, providing a more solid basis for
conduct.
Certainly each foundation differs in significant ways from the others. In
fact, clear tensions among them exist. Indeed, when reasons from autonomy
or community conflict with those from morality, moral reasons should
presumptively prevail, as demonstrated in Part III. In this way, the morality
foundation is the top vertex of the triangle framing the concepts of legal
ethics, with autonomy and community securing the two bases.
Nevertheless, having focused so much on the differences among these
foundations, 25 it is now time to highlight their connections. There are
several reasons for this focus. First, the strengths and limitations of each of
the autonomy, community, and morality foundations have by now been so
well developed, critiqued, and revised that the discipline has little to gain
from continuing this cycle of critique.26 Second, to the extent the dialogue
on legal ethics consists of nothing other than argument and counter-
argument, there is a danger that the discipline will spiral into undue
skepticism, if not cynicism, about the efficacy of establishing a convincing
ethical base to the profession. Third, to the extent confusion marks concep-
23. Id. at 332.
24. The court notes that twenty days' notice was proper. Beiny v. Wynard, 517 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
25. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
26. Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 27 (1991) (describing
limitations of current legal ethics scholarship and, hence, the need to move in a different direction).
[Vol. 7:89
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tualization of the field, it is likely that lawyers' ethics will continue to
disenchant. Fourth, since ethical decisionmaking is complicated, reflecting
at least the three foundations of autonomy, community, and morality, it
seems more fruitful to establish a more complete, ultimately more cohesive,
framework for solving questions of professional responsibility. In this way, a
stronger ethical base to the profession may be forged, one that more
faithfully reflects its central tenets, but also meets its needs.
Better reflecting the key attributes of lawyering, such an integrated
perspective more realistically captures the complexity of life and law and
thereby better bridges the gap between theory and practice. This approach
also provides legal ethics with more conceptual coherence and stability,
anchoring practice, so that lawyers can reliably draw upon a set of central
conceptions to solve concrete professional responsibility problems. In this
way, a sound framework may be forged from which to apply careful
attention to the demands of concrete cases.27 Lawyers can then more
confidently render advice and ethical guidance to their clients.
In reasoning through problems of professional responsibility and render-
ing advice and ethical guidance, therefore, lawyers should address clients
and their problems in all of their dimensions - not just legal concerns, but
also moral, psychological, human, economic, social, and prudential inter-
ests, as appropriate.2 Interests relevant to clients involve duties to them-
selves in achieving their rights under the law, duties to community arising
from their connections and sense of belonging to others, including lawyers
and our system of law, and duties to conscience as given content by
fundamental moral norms.
Lawyers should likewise bring their full human dimensions to bear in
their relationship with clients. Relevant lawyer interests include duties to
clients in helping empower and enable them to achieve their rights within
the constraints of a complicated legal system; duties to community on
account of lawyers' connections and sense of belonging to others, including
clients, fellow members of the legal profession, and the broader community
of law and society; and duties to conscience as given content by fundamental
moral norms.
This more comprehensive relationship between two morally autonomous
and fully connected people responsive to their obligations is more likely to
address responsibly the full range of concerns implicated in concrete
27. Pepper, Ethical Role, supra note 3, at 658 ("[lit is essential that professionals have a coherent
structure to apply to the ethical problems they confront if their choices are to be educated and
thought through.").
28. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 668 (1986); Pepper, Autonomy, supra note
16, at 949, 957 (elaborating on the ideal paradigm of the attorney-client relationship).
1993]
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cases.2 9 The relationship sought here is a cooperative, interdependent one
where both lawyer and client inform one another, as compared to patroniza-
tion or domination of one by the other.3" This fuller relationship might
prove indispensable to achieving more sensible solutions to problems,
thereby ameliorating the dissatisfaction with lawyers' ethics.
Part II next describes a fuller set of ideas constitutive of this more
comprehensive dialogue between attorneys and their clients. These ideas
are drawn from each of the three foundations of legal ethics. Again, the
emphasis is on building a set of central ideas which form a sound framework
to apply to the solution of professional responsibility questions. Part III
illustrates how this framework may be applied, using the dynamic of sound,
practical reasoning and prudential judgment. Such critical, imaginative
reasoning might be our best hope at present for reaching a broad range of
satisfactory solutions to legal ethical questions.
II. THE IDEAS CONSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE
The purpose here is to set forth the central ideas constitutive of the
lawyering role. These ideas are drawn from each of the three foundations of
legal ethics, those of autonomy, community, and morality. The ideas
described are not meant to be exclusive. Indeed, each foundation is richer
than portrayed here. Rather, the emphasis is on identifying a set of central
ideas that reflect the main tenets of the profession, illuminating the area
within which lawyers ought to dwell. This Part first briefly describes the
central ideas comprising each of the autonomy, community, and morality
foundations of legal ethics. Each subsection then highlights the connections
between one foundation and those of the other two. In this way, an
overlapping conceptual consensus is achieved, revealing the central ethical
core of the profession.
29. The key to this more comprehensive relationship is the "moral dialogue" elaborated on by
Professor Shaffer. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 231 (1979) [hereinafter Shaffer, Practice] ("The beginning and end of a lawyer's
professional life is talking with a client about what is to be done. My claim here is that this is a moral
conversation." (footnote omitted)). Now, of course, the moral dialogue is a standard part of the
literature. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 57; Lawry, supra note 4, at 353; Pepper, Ethical Role,
supra note 3, at 630-32.
30. Shaffer, Practice, supra note 29, at 234-37, 246, 248-50, 252-53 Although lawyer and client are
autonomous moral agents, their relationship is a mutually dependent one. Lawyers should not
patronize clients, make decisions for them, defer to them absolutely, or isolate themselves from
them. Instead, Professor Shaffer advocates a collaborative model of a continuing moral dialogue
between them. Id. See also Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV.
319, 319-20 (1987) [hereinafter Shaffer, Good Client] (drawing upon Martin Buber, the relationship
sought is an "I-Thou" one where each can inform the other morally and emotionally, as opposed to
an "I-It" relationship, where the lawyer counsels but refuses to be counseled). See Lee A.
Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty To Warn Clients About Limits On Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REV.
441, 475-76 & nn.150 & 152 (1990).
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A. THE AUTONOMY FOUNDATION
1. Description
The autonomy foundation of legal ethics is the standard conception of
contemporary law practice, viewing the lawyer as a facilitator of her client's
interests and rights within the legal system.31 Pursuant to this conception,
lawyers' primary loyalties are to clients in helping them achieve their due in
society.32 By applying their specialized legal knowledge and skill to their
clients' problems, lawyers3 3 help clients achieve personal freedom, liberty,
and dignity - in short, their "autonomy." In this sense, autonomy is a base
idea or set of ideas constitutive of legal ethics. 34
In this traditional view of the profession, lawyers have special reasons to
act on behalf of their clients; they owe special loyalty obligations to clients.
35
These ideas support a presumption in favor of attorney loyalty to clients, a
presumption rebuttable only in the face of more compelling claims.36 In this
sense loyalty means fidelity to particular people - individual clients - as
compared to loyalty to community or certain moral ideals or values.
As professionals, lawyers should, of course, be trustworthy, honest,
competent, diligent, fair, loyal, and discreet. 37 But lawyers should also be
thoughtful and prudent about themselves, their craft, their obligations, and
their clients.3s Professional responsibility standards capture these ideas
most centrally in the provisions covering duties of competence, 39 confidenti-
31. The present author described an "autonomy" model of legal ethics in earlier articles. See
Anthony D'Amato & Edward J. Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 761,
764-70 (1983); Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 2-3. The "autonomy" model described in
these earlier articles has certain parallels to the autonomy foundation described herein, but also
differs in significant ways. Summarily stated, the autonomy foundation propounded here provides a
much richer description of the concept of autonomy.
32. Professor Freedman speaks of a client-centered ethic of trust and confidence. FREEDMAN,
supra note 3, at 87.
33. Professor Hazard speaks of this professional role as a lawyer's "specific station in life, a
particular vocation." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., My Station as a Lawyer, 6 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7
(1989).
34. Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16, at 944. Professor Pepper has elaborated on the autonomy
foundation of legal ethics in his articles. See Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16; Pepper, Ethical Role,
supra note 3.
35. M. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 77-99 (2d ed. 1989). See also Pepper, Ethical Role, supra
note 3, at 615 ("The very idea of a profession connotes the function of service, the notion that to
some degree the professional is to subordinate his interests to the interests of those in need of his
services.").
36. Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 367, 397 (1992)
(elaborating on concept of loyalty in lawyering).
37. MODEL RULES pmbl.; BAYLES, supra note 35.
38. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law TeacherAvoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC.
3, 5 (1991) ("For me, the good lawyer is loyal and faithful to her client but also thinks about how the
tools of her craft are being put to use; it matters what interests and whom she serves.")
39. MODEL RULES Rule 1.1.
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ality,4" diligence, 4' zealousness of representation in pursuit of client objec-
tives,42 and loyalty to clients.
43
At the root of this conception of autonomy is belief in the inherent dignity
of human beings.4 4 Autonomy empowers people to make choices concern-
ing their lives without coercion, manipulation, or oppression, all contrary to
the ideal of autonomy.45 In this way autonomy promotes personal freedom,
self-determination, and self-realization of one's talents, abilities, and over-
all destiny in life.46 Such self-realization, in turn, facilitates achievement of
rationality, prudence, commitment, and responsibility, all desirable virtues.
Because our society is complicated and legalistic, resort to the law is often
necessary to make meaningful choices about life. Since the law itself is
complex, laypersons cannot effectively exercise the autonomy they possess
without the assistance of lawyers. 47 By applying their professional knowl-
edge and skill to the needs of their clients, lawyers provide this access to the
law, facilitating client choice. Ideally, attorneys should explain and explore
the options available to laypersons with respect to their problems so that
clients can meaningfully participate in their affairs and make informed
choices about them. 8 In this way, lawyers empower others to discover and
pursue their autonomy.49
40. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6.
41. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3.
42. Compare MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon
7 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] (stating that a lawyer should represent a client zealously within
the bounds of the law).
43. MODEL RULES Rules 1.7 to 1.11 (concerning conflicts of interest).
44. Professor Freedman argues convincingly for recognition of the inherent dignity of each
person. FREEDMAN, supra note 3. "One of the essential values of a just society is respect for the
dignity of each member of that society. Essential to each individual's dignity is the free exercise of
his autonomy." Id. at 57. "1 find deep moral significance in the dignity of the individual and in the
way that dignity is respected in the American constitutional adversary system." Id. at 121. "The
central concern of a system of professional ethics, therefore, should be to strengthen the role of the
lawyer in enhancing individual human dignity within the adversary system of justice." Id. at 42.
45. Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16, at 944-46. "The opposite of autonomy is unchosen or
unaccepted restraint: domination and oppression by others." Id. at 945. This is very much a Kantian
notion - a desire to be a free, autonomous being, to be treated as an end, not just a means.
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (L.W. Beck trans., 2d ed. 1959)
("Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end
and never as a means only."). See also supra note 154 and accompanying text.
46. See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 411, 420-21, 447-49 (1992) [hereinafter Eberle, Practical Reason] (describing value of self-
realization in First Amendment theory).
47. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 47 ("[S]ocial institutions [and the law] are so complex that
without the assistance of an expert adviser, an ordinary lay person cannot exercise the personal
autonomy to which he or she is morally and legally entitled within the system."). See also Fried,
supra note 3, at 1073.
48. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 48 (citing Sylvia A. Law, Afterward: The Purpose of Professional
Education, in LOOKING AT LAW SCHOOL, 205, 212-13 (Gillers ed., 1977)).
49. Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16, at 940.
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The quality of autonomy has a yet more concrete meaning within the
American constitutional system. Rooted in the fundamental freedoms
embodied in our Bill of Rights, a person may exercise choice with respect to
a catalogue of constitutional rights that include freedom of expression,
conscience, and exercise of religion, equality, and due process of law,
including a sphere of personal privacy. 50 These freedoms aid, enforce, and
enlarge the content of autonomy that may be achieved, individually and
collectively.
Because equality is central to our regime of constitutional rights, all
persons should have access to a full entitlement of rights or other legal
entitlements in order to pursue their ends. Each person should be free to
construct and follow his or her own vision.5" Less than complete access to
the fullness of the law is a form of second class citizenship, intolerable in a
society that values equality.52
Autonomy possesses a deeper and richer meaning than individual self-
realization. Individual rights and claims are also fundamental relational
concepts for personal expression.53 There are a rich spectrum of ways in
which such entitlements may be exercised. For example, one can exercise
these rights or claims selfishly, selflessly, beneficently, belligerently, defen-
sively, offensively, carefully, or carelessly. How one expresses his or her
rights says a great deal about the person's character and personality. Such
expression, in turn, affects others. There is skill, even art, to the proper
exercise of rights.54
One can also choose to withhold exercise of one's rights or claims, or
50. U.S. CONST. amends. 1, V, XIV. Professor Freedman is a forceful advocate of a system of legal
ethics rooted in the Bill of Rights. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 7 ("[T]he central concern of lawyers'
ethics is ... how far I should be required to go - to achieve for my client full and equal rights under
[the] law .... I think of lawyers' ethics as being rooted in the Bill of Rights as expressed in the
American adversary system.").
51. See generally Eberle, Practical Reason, supra note 46, at 420-21, 430, 447-49, 457-59, 486-88
(discussing the values of equality and self-realization in the theory of free speech).
52. Pepper Ethical Role, supra note 3, at 618 ("It is apparent that a final significant value
supporting the first-class citizenship model is that of equality. If law is a public good, access to which
increases autonomy, then equality of access is important."). See also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF THE LAW 49-51 (1964) (declaring that the essential element of law's inner morality is that the
content of the law be readily available to those who are governed by it); Fuller & Randall, supra note
9, at 1216 (stating that "one of the highest goals of society must be to achieve and maintain equality
before the law").
53. JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 67 (1972) [hereinafter FEINBERG, SOCIAL] (arguing that
person is a rightholder "when he has a claim, the recognition of which is called for - not
(necessarily) by legal rules b- ut by moral principles, or the principles of an enlightened
conscience."); Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 2 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 7 (1978) [hereinafter Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia] (contending that rights can be waived,
transferred, overridden, vindicated, violated, forfeited, or sold, among other functions). See
generally John Tomasi, Individual Rights and Community Virtues, 101 ETHICS 521, 524-25, 527 (1991).
54. Tomasi, supra note 53, at 527.
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relinquish, transfer, or abandon them.55 Entitlements can have important
value when withheld. They can also be held selfishly, selflessly, beneficently,
belligerently, defensively, offensively, carefully, or carelessly. Voluntarily
withholding rights or claims can exhibit special moral worth, 6xpressing with
great force the meaning of the entitlement, and the content of personal
character.56
For example, consider the conduct of some small town trial lawyers
evidenced in a study. These lawyers "were unwilling to use sharp tactics to
gain an advantage over a lawyer they knew and regularly dealt with. As one
said, 'you don't file a five-day motion on Charley Jones when he's on a
two-week vacation, or try to take advantage of him. If he's forgot to file an
answer, you don't ask the judge for default, you call him. .. [Flairness is
more important than winning.' "" Or consider forgiving a debt or resched-
uling its repayment so as not to push someone involuntarily into bankruptcy.
Or consider not asserting technical defenses to defeat just claims.
Beyond self-realization and expression, constitutional rights form a vital
part of the liberal political strategy in helping guarantee the necessary
sphere of autonomy for people to live their lives free from the coercive
power of government or other majoritarian groups in society. In theory, a
regime of civil rights does not impose any particular conception of the good.
Rather, rights limit the role of government and dominant social groups from
determining visions of the good that all might otherwise be coerced to
follow. By limiting official power, rights allow people to pursue freely their
individual and collective conceptions of the good.58 This guarantees a
certain minimal level of opportunity for all people to realize their talents,
aspirations, and goals in life. Minority persons, groups, viewpoints, and
beliefs are thereby especially safeguarded from oppression. Rights thus
55. Joel Feinberg explains:
[wihen a person has a discretionary right and fully understands the power that possession
gives him, he can if he chooses make sacrifices for the sake of others, voluntarily give up
what is rightfully his own, freely make gifts that he is in no way obligated to make, and
forgive others their wrongs to him by declining to demand the compensation or vengeance
he may have coming .... Imagine what life would be like without these saving graces.
JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 156 (1978) (hereinafter FEINBERG,
RIGHTS].
56. Tomasi, supra note 53, at 525. Rights or claims can thereby give expression to "saving graces,"
like "fraternity, benevolence, generosity and forgiveness." Id.
57. Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV.
1529, 1547 (citing Donald Landon, Clients, Colleagues & Community: The Shaping of Zealous
Advocacy in Country Law Practice (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), which has since been published
as Donald Landon, Clients, Colleagues, and Community: The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Country
Law Practice, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 81, 107.).
58. Allen E. Buchanon, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHICS 852, 854,
858 (1989). Buchanon states that "the liberal political thesis rests on the plausible assumption that
we cannot afford to rely on ... luck ... to achieve ... a stable set of humane values." Id. at 872.
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help preserve the dignity of all persons and, in this way, the overall integrity
of society.59
Rights also speak to the dynamics of human personality and community.
They provide a mechanism for the testing out of varied opinions, ideas, and
conduct. Alternative and varied conceptions of the good may thus be put to
the hard test of experience. In this way, rights help preserve the balance
between stability and change in individuals and society, giving vent to
dissent, difference, and creativity.6 ° Rights thereby help modulate society,
allowing for the open possibilities of change and human progress.6'
This country's private legal system (contracts, corporations, wills, trusts,
property, etc.) also enables people to pursue meaningfully their au-
tonomy.62 Of course, regulatory law has grown immensely, circumscribing
individual choice. Still, private law leaves a great deal of room for individual
choice to structure personal affairs. This also helps diffuse power through-
out society.
63
It is access to this world that lawyers provide when they facilitate others'
autonomy. Lawyers both aid others' realization of autonomy and help
protect others against encroachments of their freedom.
2. Connection to Community
As individuals, human beings are both separate from and related to
others. Community helps form one's character, but each person also needs
to make choices about community. While it is desirable to be connected to
others, it is also desirable to be separate. One may choose to form relations
with others, as well as to seek tranquility or solitude. One may seek to do
both. Much of life involves working out this tension between individuality
and community, and this tension must be worked out in legal ethics as
well.64
One way to lessen this tension is by connecting autonomy and community
through the concept of well-being, a concern for the good of self and of
59. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 35 (Harold J. Berman ed.,
rev. ed. 1973).
60. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970) (describing the safety
value function of free speech in "achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community
... maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus").
61. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 14 (1958) (Ist ed. 1859); Eberle, Practical Reason, supra note
46, at 419.
62. Pepper, Ethical Role, supra note 3, at 617.
63. Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16, at 943 n.12.
64. Id. at 940-42. Pepper highlights the communitarian view, which "emphasizes the socially
embedded and connected nature of human life, the fact that we are necessarily and basically
connected to others: first to families; later to larger intermediate groups; ultimately, and perva-
sively, a large part of our 'selves' determined by and part of the culture and society in which we are
raised." Id. at 940.
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others. Certainly a necessary component of well-being is autonomy. A
degree of control over life is essential to well-being.65
But another vital aspect of well-being is relations to others, including
sharing activities or interests. Autonomy allows one to form these relations
with others.6 6 Indeed, "connection and community are part of what we all
want, they are part both of what we are and of what we choose, and the
combination" constitutes part of our autonomy.67 In this sense, autonomy
and community complement one another.
Crucial to accomplishing this is how rights or claims are exercised. Rights
or claims may be exercised in ways that form relations with others, contrib-
ute to others' realization of control over their lives, or do justice, individu-
ally and collectively. Again, attorneys should consider desisting from sharp
legal tactics to gain an advantage or rescheduling payment of debts.68 Or
consider efforts to obtain equal opportunities for all citizens in education
69
or other important aspects of life. 70 Rights can thereby form the basis for
genuine, noncoerced human connection, discourse, and community.
Exercise of rights can also protect and sustain community. When people
exercise constitutional rights they check government, mediating between
government on the one hand, and communities or individuals on the other.
Rights thereby act as a bulwark for the preservation of spheres of liberty in
which people can group together for common purposes. This helps diffuse
power throughout society, elaborating a more intricate system of checks and
balances than formal structural division of governmental power, thereby
allowing people and communities to realize their potentials and aspirations
free from official coercion. Genuine, freely chosen communities can thus be
formed. These communities are intermediate between the state and citi-
zens. It seems too difficult and risky to form large-scale, all-encompassing
communities.7
In such intermediate communities, noncoerced expression, choice, and
65. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response To Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 637, 642-43.
66. Buchanon, supra note 58, at 878, 878-80 (discussing how theories of Dworkin, Feinberg, and
Rawls can be interpreted to "include not only the value of individual autonomy but also that of
individual well-being").
67. Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16, at 945.
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
69. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the "separate but equal"
doctrine has no place in public education).
70. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-568 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
requires seats in state legislatures to be apportioned on a population basis so that one person has
one vote).
71. In the modern era, communities have been the source of society's greatest nightmares as well as
dreams. Attempts at forming all-inclusive political communities have resulted in totalitarianism as
in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Thus, it seems preferable "to lower our sights" and focus on
creating and sustaining intermediate communities instead. Buchanon, supra note 58, at 860.
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conduct can be exercised in the more intimate context of families, friends,
neighborhoods, churches, synagogues, universities, organizations, associa-
tions, or jobs, among other settings.72 People should "naturally form and
join the social relations and forums in which they come to understand and
pursue the good.",73 This is especially important in our pluralistic society,
where no single, overarching vision of community reigns.
Exercise of constitutional rights especially protects communities of
thought, religion, belief, or association from coercive governmental power.
For example, consider exercise of First Amendment free exercise of religion
rights. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,74 Amish were able to realize their goal of living
in a "church community separate and apart from the world" by exercising
these rights.75 They successfully challenged a state compulsory high school
education requirement by demonstrating that this requirement "[carried]
with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious
practice as they exist today.",76 Compulsory high school education required
the Amish "to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of
their religious beliefs.",
77
Or consider exercise of First Amendment freedom of expression and
association rights. In NAACP v. Button,78 the NAACP successfully chal-
lenged a Virginia law directed at the NAACP's litigation strategy in
achieving desegregation. The Supreme Court held that, as applied to the
NAACP's activities, the law violated the First Amendment.
[T]here is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments protect certain forms of orderly group activity. Thus we have
affirmed the right 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas.' .. . [W]hile serving to vindicate the legal rights of members of
72. See id. at 856-57. Buchanon notes that:
Communitarians emphasize that a genuine community is not a mere association of
individuals. Members of a community have common ends, not merely congruent private
interests, and these are conceived of and valued as common ends by the members. If I am a
member of a community I share goals and values with other members .... [T]he distinction
between 'mine' and 'theirs' breaks down or at least recedes into the background.
In contrast, in a mere association, individuals conceive of their interests as independent
and potentially opposed. Their relationships with one another are viewed not as in
themselves constituting the good of their endeavors but as the means toward private goods
independently identified. The close-knit, harmonious family is usually taken as a paradigm
of community, while a contractual relationship between economic agents in the market
serves as an archetype for mere associations.
Id.
73. Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS 883, 904 (1989).
74. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
75. Id. at 210.
76. Id. at 218.
77. Id.
78. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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the American Negro community, [the NAACP] at the same time and
perhaps more importantly, makes possible the distinctive contribution of
a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society.
79
In these ways, exercise of autonomy can enhance community and commu-
nity autonomy. Reasons or ideas drawn from each need not be incompat-
ible. In fact, they can be mutually supportive. This interrelationship can
form the basis for a richer concept of self-realization, communication, and
connection.
Nevertheless, while individuals are connected, they are also separate
from one another. There is tension between individuals and community as
well as connectedness. It is important to recognize the fault lines running
between autonomy and community.
For example, overemphasis on autonomy can lead to disconnection and
isolation. Individuals' pursuit of wholly self-interested ends without regard
to consequences is egoistic. Radical individualism of this sort can under-
mine the possibilities for forming commitments or connections to others,
thereby undermining community.8 ° In legal ethics, radical individualism
manifests as hyperpartisanship and overzealousness, a zeal beyond what the
concept of loyalty to client requires. When unbounded by respect for the
law or morality, such conduct undermines the law.81
For example, consider again the lawyers' overzealousness in Beiny. Pro-
moting the client's case should not call for bending discovery rules or
misrepresenting crucial facts.8" Or consider
[v]arious harassment techniques [like] ... calling the opposing counsel on
the telephone in the middle of the night, letting the air out of his
automobile tire, or sending him a phony client to waste his time ... [o]r
tak[ing] an unwarrantably restrictive view of the other side's discovery
requests - which apparently has already become "good adversary
practice" among practitioners, showing how the word "good" can be
perverted.8 3
79. Id. at 430-31.
80. Of course, egoistic conduct of this sort is not moral, see D'Amato and Eberle, supra note 31, at
798, nor is it beneficial to society. See generally Shaffer, Radical Individualism, supra note 10.
81. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER 286, 311
n.9 (David Luban ed., 1983) (arguing that "the principle of partisanship requires the lawyer
zealously and with exclusive loyalty to pursue the client's objectives .... "); Murray L. Schwartz, The
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978) (describing the
principle of nonaccountability: "when acting as an advocate for a client ... a lawyer is neither
legally, professionally, nor morally accountable for the means used or the ends achieved"); Serena
Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OH1o ST. L.J. 551, 572, 574 (1991) ("Since partisan
advocacy is unconstrained by moral considerations, it results in adversarial excesses that themselves
serve to undermine the legitimacy of the law.").
82. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
83. D'Amato and Eberle, supra note 31, at 768.
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Or consider making "truthful opposing witnesses look like liars or fools,"
defeating "just claims on technicalities if it can be done," failing to disclose
adverse applicable precedent, or other tactics of delay, obfuscation, or
abuse.84
Still, it is not inevitable that such radically individual conduct occur or
persist or that autonomy and community ideas clash with one another in this
way. Rather, these ideas can complement one another too. Consider
exercise of free speech rights, where expression of personal views also
serves society's interest in the free dissemination of ideas. For example, one
can consider how exercise of commercial speech rights disseminates impor-
tant matters of public inteiest: "[a] manufacturer of artificial furs promotes
his product as an alternative to the extinction by his competitors of
fur-bearing mammals ... [or] a domestic producer advertises his product as
an alternative to imports that tend to deprive American residents of their
jobs." 85
Lawyers play a vital role in linking these concepts of autonomy and
community, in building and sustaining our society.86 While lawyers em-
power and enable others, they also connect others to community by commu-
nicating the constraints of the law and society. These constraints reflect
underlying moral and social ideas which, in turn, form the backdrop against
which choice is exercised. Thus, autonomy is not without limit; rather, it is
constrained by moral and social norms.
Accordingly, one must develop a capacity to exercise rights and claims
properly, within this context. There is a need to achieve "the right balance
between support for the group and protection for the individual,"87 a
balance each individual must work out as part of the fabric of life.
3. Connection to Morality
Autonomy also has important connections to morality. Since autonomy
empowers one to act, one can choose to act in ways or in favor of ends that
are either good or bad in a moral sense. Thus, while it is good for people to
act autonomously, not all autonomous acts are morally good - whether
they are or not depends on their moral quality. To determine this question
84. David Luban, Introduction to THE GOOD LAWYER 1-2 (David Luban ed., 1983). A lawyer is, of
course, obligated to disclose controlling legal authority directly adverse to the client if not disclosed
by opposing counsel. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(3).
85. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 748, 764 (1976).
86. MODEL CODE pmbl. ("Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of
society."); accord MODEL RULES pmbl. ("Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The
fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system.
The Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.").
87. Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16, at 963.
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one must evaluate conduct, both with respect to ends pursued and the
means by which they are advanced.
In legal ethics, autonomy and morality are linked over a wide range of
choices. Most choices that attorneys make possess a moral dimension. For
example, the decision whether to represent a particular client is a choice
that possesses moral quality,18 as is the choice of the means to carry out the
client's ends. 89 Likewise, the decision to decline or terminate the rendering
of services is also a choice that has a certain moral quality. In these ways,
lawyers are morally accountable for their conduct.
Beyond this convergence, the autonomy and morality foundations can
unravel, revealing a gulf in belief between proponents of these two views of
legal ethics. Past the initial decision of engagement, for example, autono-
mists would defer to the client or the system of justice on most questions of
legal ethics, on the assumption that these bodies bear ultimate responsibil-
ity for the representation. In an automonist's view, lawyers are justified in
advancing clients' cases within the constraints of the legal system without
further assumption of moral responsibility for their conduct. 90
Legal moralists, on the other hand, do not countenance relinquishment of
responsibility to clients or the system of law. Instead, they argue that
lawyers should assume fundamental moral responsibility for their actions
throughout the course of representation, both with respect to ends ad-
vanced and the means by which they are achieved. 9' In this view, lawyers are
responsible for the advice they give, and the tactics, arguments, and
strategies they employ to achieve client ends. 92 Autonomy entitles one to
exercise, and assume, such moral responsibility.
In assuming such responsibility, morally conscious lawyers need to be
careful that they not substitute their views for those of their clients, make
decisions for them, or otherwise act paternalistically. 93 Lawyers and clients
are independent moral agents, each responsible for their own conduct.
Therefore, lawyers must respect the dignity and autonomy of clients,
88. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 49.
89. Stier, supra note 81, at 565 ("Lawyers are morally responsible for.., their decision whether
or not to represent particular clients ... [and] for the kinds of arguments and tactics they decide to
use on behalf of a client ....").
90. Kathleen S. Bean, A Proposal for the Moral Practice of Law, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 49, 54 (1987);
Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 3-4, 37-39; Shaffer, Good Client, supra note 30, at 327
("The meaning of the legal ethics of autonomy is that lawyers should not be moral influences on
their clients."). On the other hand, Monroe Freedman advocates moral counsel, but once the client
makes a decision, the lawyer should promote client desires. Id. at 327-28 (citing Monroe Freedman,
Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191 (1978)).
91. Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 4, 39.
92. Stier, supra note 81, at 565.
93. Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 4, 5. Lawyers should not "superimpose their
moral standards on clients .... [However,] there is an appropriate place for moral concerns in
practice, and lawyers should not be shy about raising them when relevant." Id.
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including clients' right to make decisions affecting their interests. While it is
desirable to offer, even assert, conscience when required, it is improper for
lawyers to impose it.94 Ultimately, clients are responsible for their use of
lawyers' advice. 95
Likewise, clients need to respect the dignity and autonomy of their
lawyers, including morally responsible lawyers' pursuit of ethical ends and
means in their conduct. It is essential that lawyers and clients respect the
boundaries of their respective moral autonomy and accompanying zone of
decision-making. 96 To the extent client objectives conflict with such attor-
ney moral autonomy, and such conflict is unresolvable upon consideration
and consultation, lawyers and clients may need to part ways. Boundaries
have concrete limits. Of course, any such parting must be carried out in a
professionally responsible fashion. 97
B. THE COMMUNITY FOUNDATION
1. Description
A second foundation of legal ethics is community. The community
foundation consists of a lawyer's character, obligations to the legal system as
officer of the court, and, more broadly, guardian of the law, and obligations
94. Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: Text, Subtext, and Context,
41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 29, 40 (1991) ("[T]o accept moral responsibility is not necessarily to impose it.").
95. Stier, supra note 81, at 565.
96. Professor Stier identifies a "boundaries principle" that "affirms the moral autonomy of both
the client and the attorney,... requir[ing] lawyers to respect the boundary between themselves as
independent moral agents and their clients as independent moral agents." Id. at 564. The
boundaries further entail lawyers' moral responsibility for their own acts, including clients chosen,
advice given, and tactics used on behalf of clients. On the other hand, clients are morally responsible
for their acts, including the "goals those arguments and tactics seek to further." Id. at 565. But
clients are not morally responsible to their lawyers; rather, only to themselves. Model Rule 1.2
outlines the scope of representation as a boundary between objectives of representation, where "a
lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions," and means by which the objectives are pursued, of which
the lawyer "shall consult with the client." MODEL RULES Rule 1.2. Nevertheless, "[b]oth lawyer and
client have authority and responsibility in the objectives and means of representation." Id. at cmt.
[1]. Professor Maute has amplified the objectives/means model of decision-making set forth in the
Model Rules. See generally Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1049 (1984). While decisionmaking is shared,
each has presumptive spheres of authority. Id. at 1066-67. "The client has ultimate authority over
objectives, . . . [including] the client's overall purpose or desired result, other matters affecting the
client's legal rights, obligations, or financial interests, and subjective concerns, including business,
political, moral, or personal values." Id. at 1063. The lawyer has presumptive authority over legal,
tactical, and technical issues, and may override client choice when the law requires other results. Id.
at 1064-66. Borderline questions should be resolved through consensus and cooperation. Id. at
1061-62.
97. The author of this article has previously described scenarios involving such conflicts, resulting
in lawyer disclosure and withdrawal in a professionally responsible manner. Eberle, Moral Responsi-
bility, supra note 5, at 25-28, 32-36.
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to society at large, as public servant. In this way, a lawyer is guided by a
professional ideal consisting of fidelity to the virtue of good character and to
the concept of a just system of law,98 as compared to the loyalty to clients
characteristic of the autonomy foundation.
These community ideas are the concepts through which a lawyer person-
ally influences and affects people, making, molding, and shaping the commu-
nity of law. The community of law, in turn, helps constitute a just, well-
ordered society. In these ways, community is a base idea or set of ideas
constituting legal ethics.
Character is crucial to legal ethics and the ethical practice of law. Certain
"excellences of character... are demanded by and displayed in law
practice," 99 like candor, honesty, discreetness, sound judgment, and cour-
age. In this sense, character is the foundation on which an individual's
practice of law is built.
The quality of character is most apparent in the approach one brings to
interpretation and application of the law, especially professional responsi-
bility standards. How one interprets the law speaks to the type of person
one is. In this way, character is indispensable to professional responsibility.
One can approach the law as either a good or bad reader.1 °°
A good reader tries to read the law fairly and honestly and then apply it in
a faithful manner. Good readers are persons of good character who possess
integrity and soundness of moral principle. They have the capacity to apply
moral principles to concrete situations and engage in moral reasoning,
picking out the right reason to act and so acting. Lawyers should strive to act
98. McChrystal, supra note 36, at 387.
99. Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 861 (1987). See also MODEL
RULES Rule 8.1, 8.4; MODEL CODE EC 1-3, DR 1-101 to DR 1-103.
100. Professor Stier states:
[the] integrity thesis reads the [professional responsibility] standards as they are addressed
to those seeking ethical guidance - persons of good character .... The law of lawyering is
designed to be read, first, by lawyers with good character who are disposed to be good
lawyers. Such persons meet the good reader requirement by seeking to read a text honestly
and implement it fairly. For good readers, the integrity thesis proposes a way of understand-
ing the standards agreeably with their characters. In contrast, persons of bad character will
not be induced to act as persons of virtue simply by providing them with a set of rules.
Stier, supra note 81, at 587-88 (footnotes omitted). Professor Stier's argument builds on the
jurisprudence of legal positivism, which emphasizes the separation of law from morality. According
to this philosophy, the law is best understood as a set of statements of what the law is, not what the
law ought to be. Nevertheless, while there is no necessary connection between law and morals, it
does not follow that there is no connection. Professor Stier accepts the separation of law from
morality in professional responsibility law but argues there is ample room for the exercise of ethical
discretion. Of course, much depends on whether one approaches the law as a good or bad reader. Id.
at 580-91.
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in all their professional dealings in this way, as a person of good character
would act.''
By contrast, a bad reader is like Holmes' bad man.10 2 Such a reader is
inclined not to read the law in a virtuous way. Rather, the bad reader sees
the law as a set of commands which must be obeyed out of fear of sanction.
While the bad reader responds to law in its mandatory character and
therefore complies with it in minimal ways, the good reader strives to realize
law's aspirations.
Character is also important as a basis for forming relations or connections
to others. Truthfulness, honesty, loyalty, courage, tolerance, and fairness
are virtues others properly desire to emulate, learning by example how to
act. 103 How one acts has consequences for others.'° 4 Lawyering involves this
sense of responsibility to others. It influences the respect others have for
one another and the law, among other effects."0 5 Each person should thus
101. Professor Shaffer has been instrumental in building a legal ethics around character and then
relating character to community. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Belonging, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 703 (1988) [hereinafter Shaffer, Belonging]; Shaffer, Radical Individualism, supra note 10, at 964
n.4, 978 (applying Aristotelian ethic to acquire the "moral art of seeing"); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal
Ethics After Babel, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 989, 997 (1990). [("Virtue and good character are goals in
themselves.") [hereinafter Shaffer, Babel]. See also Lawry, supra note 4, at 337 ("[L]awyers should
try to act in all of their professional dealings as a good person should act.").
102. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897):
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to
avoid an encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the practical
importance of the distinction between morality and law. A man who cares nothing for an
ethical rule which is believed and practiced by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a
good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can.
Id.
103. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 10 (stories of characters and virtues worth
emulating); Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lawyer
Professionalism asA MoralArgument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 396 (1991) [hereinafter Shaffer, Moral
Argument]. Shaffer explains:
[v]irtue words, as distinguished from principle words, speak about moral qualities. Aristotle
and his teachers and his students taught morals by describing the virtues they noticed in
admirable people ....
The virtues are good habits.... This way of looking at our moral lives is focused on
being good, rather than being right .... Virtue words focus on persons more than on
actions; on good habits rather than quandaries and choices.
Id. (footnote omitted); Thomas L. Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, Character & Community: Rispetto As a
Virtue in the Tradition of Italian -American Lawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838 (1989); Michael I.
Swygert, Striving to Make Great Lawyers - Citizenship and Moral Responsibility: A Jurisprudence for
Law Teaching, 30 B.C. L. REV. 803 (1989).
104. Morgan, Professionalism, supra note 4, at 462.
105. See Morgan, Evolving, supra note 3, at 705 ("The impact of a legal dispute is rarely confined
to the situation of the parties involved. Whether justice is secured in a particular case affects not
only the treatment of the individuals but also the laws which govern the conduct of others and the
respect which they will accord to the law.").
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 7:89
be thoughtful about these choices. In this way, character is an indispensable
foundation for community.
A lawyer's role as officer of the court and, more broadly, guardian of the
law, entails additional duties to the system of law and society at large,
helping further shape the community of law. 10 6 In their seminal 1958
Report of the Joint Conference, Lon Fuller and John Randall stated that
"the lawyer's highest loyalty... runs, not to persons, but to [the law's]
procedures and institutions." The lawyer's role within the legal system
therefore "imposes on him a trusteeship for the integrity of those fundamen-
tal processes of government and self-government upon which the successful
functioning of our society depends."' 1 7 These are positive obligations which
may limit what a lawyer may achieve for his or her clients. In this way, duties
to clients are mediated by interests of justice or the law, another example of
autonomy being constrained by moral and social norms.
These aspects of legal ethics are captured most centrally in the standards
of professional responsibility covering honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness
to practice law;'0 8 truthfulness in statements to others;0 9 respect for rights
of third parties;" 0 candor toward the court;"' fairness to opposing parties
and counsel;"' 2 and obligations to perform pro bono 13 and law reform
activities. ' 4
Recently, a fuller communitarian ethic has emerged in response to
perceived excessive individualism in society.l 5 Our society's over-emphasis
106. See MODEL CODE pmbl. ("Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the
preservation of society.").
107. Fuller & Randall, Joint Report, supra note 9, at 1162. See also MODEL CODE pmbl. ("The
continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the concept that
justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual and his
capacity through reason for enlightened self-government.").
108. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rules 8.1 to 8.4.
109. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 4.1.
110. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 4.4.
111. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 3.3.
112. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 3.4.
113. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 6.1.
114. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 6.4.
115. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Leading communitarian work includes: ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981) (offering a neo-Aristotelian view
of ethics, emphasizing person's character and virtues, which derive from community); MICHAEL
SANDEL, LIBERALISM, AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). "[C]ommunity describes not just what they
have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary
association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their
identity." Id. at 150. Valuable descriptions of communitarianism can be found in Buchanon, supra
note 58, at 852-53 (listing five major tenets of communitarianism); Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16,
at 940-42 (summarizing recent communitarian writings); Philip Selznick, The Idea ofa Communitar-
ian Morality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 445 (1987) (defining and piecing together the moral underpinnings of
communitarian thought). In addition, Professor Shaffer has been a leading proponent of a com-
munitarian view in legal ethics. See sources cited supra notes 10, 101, 103. Of course, there are
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of autonomy too easily separates people from relations with others, thereby
promoting atomism and isolation. This devalues commitment, obligation,
and duty, undercutting the ties one has with others. Ultimately, this can
undermine community, including its system of law.
In place of preoccupation with achievement of autonomy, therefore,
communitarianism emphasizes obligations too - to others, to community
or communities, and to society at large. In this view people matter; the
human person is not just a collection of interests or an independent chooser
with respect to a bundle of rights. Rather, a person is both uniquely
constituted and a constituent part of community, inextricably bound to
others and the social setting in which one lives. Belonging thus becomes the
central value, not freedom. 16
The emphasis in ethics changes, correspondingly, from a regime of rules
to a focus on the human person: fostering the development of good
character, virtue, certain habits of reflection, and dispositions for acting. In
legal ethics, good lawyers should strive to fulfill this ideal of a professional,
acting as trustworthy, honest, fair, civil, and respectful attorneys. Good
lawyers should also not bully, coerce, deceive, or humiliate those they deal
with in the course of professional life (whether judges, opposing counsel, or
parties, clients, or witnesses.). Additionally, they should not abuse or
obfuscate the legal process. Lawyers should be thoughtful about their craft
and its effects on others in this way.
2. Connection to Autonomy
As ideas from community can enhance autonomy, so too can autonomy
ideas enhance community. Most importantly, autonomy helps build commu-
nity by infusing it with content and meaning. The key then becomes
achievement of the right kind of community, as compared to realization of
any community. The right kind of community strengthens human freedom,
well-being, dignity, and equality, enlarging opportunities for self-realiza-
tion, communication, and connection."'
An important source to so constitute community is society's concept of
alternative communitarian views. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the
Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1984) [hereinafter Simon, Decline].
116. Selznick, supra note 115, at 447. Professor Shaffer speaks of coming home, of finding where
one belongs. Shaffer, Babel, supra note 101, at 1006.
117. Gerald Doppelt, Is Rawl's Kantian Liberalism Coherent and Defensible?, 99 ETHICS 815,
839-40 (1989) (noting that Rawlsian justice and Kantian self-determination "entails just the right
kind of community, tradition, compassion and nurture, and so on for modern Western society:
namely, the kind which strengthens human freedom and dignity for all, and does not come through
the exclusion or oppression of certain groups"); Selznick, supra note 115, at 448 ("[M]orality is to be
taught and encouraged not mainly by precept, but by enlarging opportunities for communication,
interdependence, and responsibility.").
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constitutional rights. The norms there embodied include dignity, equality,
fairness, justice, freedoms of thought, expression, and conscience, tolera-
tion, due process, and sufficient privacy so that persons can freely develop
their lives. These rights prescribe ideals to aspire to, individually and
collectively." 8 Individuals' exercise of these rights, in turn, transmits impor-
tant norms, ideas, and aspirations that can transform others, including
whole communities, if not society at large. For example, again consider the
NAACP and others' assertion of free speech and associational rights in
favor of human equality, which dramatically changed American society over
the past thirty years."1 9 Additionally, how one exercises rights and claims
provides substance and definition to character. In these ways, rights form
part of the normative content of community. Ultimately, the community
society builds reflects its values, and the values reflected form its tradition,
part of the fabric of each individual.
Lawyers play a crucial role in making and molding the community or
communities they participate in on a daily basis. Lawyers transmit the limits
as well as the power of autonomy, directing realization of autonomy against
the social and moral backdrop of community.
3. Connection to Morality
A key influence of morality on community is a community's commitment
to, and realization of, justice. Justice as a branch of morality dictates that a
community be fundamentally fair.120 Equality, fairness, and due process are
attributes of justice that infuse such quality into community. These norms
additionally constrain community, helping keep it honest, true, genuine,
and inclusive. In addition, there is an important public interest in "seeing
[that] justice [is] done." 121
Other moral ideas similarly constitute, constrain, and guide community.
Honesty, fidelity, maintenance of promises and confidentiality, non-
maleficence, beneficence, and personal and social responsibility, among
other ideas, prescribe "ideals of what kinds of character are worth
118. Tomasi, supra note 53, at 522 ("IT]he moral quality of any intimate community is importantly
connected to the capacity of each community member to conceive of herself as an independent
holder of rights."). Tomasi adds that:
[R]ights are richer moral concepts than Sandel, or the other communitarians, have
recognized. Because right holders must often decide whether to assert or withhold their
claims, a rights-based system offers a ready framework for a system of ethics prescribing
ideals to those right holders, ideals of what kinds of character are worth developing, of
what kinds of persons they should be.
Id. at 535.
119. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
120. D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 780.
121. Morgan, Evolving, supra note 3, at 705.
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developing,"' 122 enlightening us as to what kind of people we should be. 12 3
Morality is taught and nurtured in this way - through example.
Finally, there are other important relational dimensions to morality too.
Morality speaks to how an individual should treat others. It requires that
one treat others as he or she would like to be treated and not treat others in
ways one would find intolerable were the situation reversed. 124 In these
ways, character embodies morality, forming a rich foundation for relating to
others.
C. THE MORALITY FOUNDATION
1. Description
The third foundation of legal ethics is morality, derived from moral
philosophy. Moral principles help guide thinking and conduct, especially
important concerns given the pressures of contemporary law practice. In
this way, a lawyer measures her conduct against certain ethical ideals and
values - attempting to remain faithful to conscience - instead of measur-
ing it against the loyalty to clients of the autonomy foundation or the fidelity
to the ideal of good character or a just legal system constitutive of the
community foundation.
Moral reasons to act are generally based on teleological or deontological
theories. Utilitarianism is the most widely applied teleological theory,
judging right and wrong by the impact of conduct on others. The morality of
conduct depends on whether it advances the greatest good of the greatest
numbers, on whether it promotes the greatest balance of good over evil.125
Thus, "[n]o action has intrinsic worth until we can assess all of its relevant
impacts, both upon all other parties and the actor." "[T]he usefulness of the
results of action is the only valid test of moral rightness and wrongness." '126
In this sense, the theory is result-oriented.
In contrast, deontological theories require certain acts to be performed
for their intrinsic worth, "regardless of their consequences for human
happiness., 127 Deontology, the "science of duty,"' 1 2 8 judges conduct by first
principles that define rights or duties worth obeying. The intrinsic worth of
the act itself determines morality. Thus, consequences are not the sole
criterion on which to judge conduct, although they may be relevant. For
example, Kant, the leading deontological theorist, asserted that people
122. Tomasi, supra note 53, at 535.
123. Id. at 531, 535.
124. Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 15-16.
125. See WOLFRAM, supra note 28, at 72-75.
126. Id. at 73.
127. D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 772.
128. Id.
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must always be treated as an end in themselves, and not as a means to an
end. 2 9 This requires that each person be accorded dignity and respect.
Certain deontological principles provide convincing reasons to act for
lawyers, helping guide reasoning and conduct. These prima facie principles
should presumptively apply absent some compelling circumstance. Con-
sider, these examples: (1) fidelity to our system of law and clients, including
preservation of confidentiality in attorney-client communications and pro-
motion of client interests, (2) non-maleficence, including duties to avoid
abuse of the legal system or those affected by it and obligations to prevent
physical and financial harms to innocent third parties, (3) providing access
to the legal system, and (4) truthfulness and honesty, including recognition
that lying, perjury, misrepresentation, misappropriation, fraud, stealing,
and cheating are moral wrongs. 13
0
Of course, it is not useful to apply a teleological-deontological dichotomy
too rigidly. The morality foundation contains elements of each. For ex-
ample, basic welfare assumptions like the pursuit of happiness or pleasure
(or in this sense "autonomy") are utilitarian. But constitutional rights or
professional norms that limit these utilitarian conceptions are deontologi-
cal. For example, while the lawyers in Beiny properly wanted to promote
their clients' interests, their zeal should reasonably have been bounded by
professional norms regulating the discovery process.' 31 The teleological
goal should have been constrained by the deontological one. "Nonetheless,
the division is a useful one for the limited purpose of general orientation in
an otherwise complex area of thought." 1
32
Furthermore, legal ethics is not wholly synonymous with moral ethics;
there are important differences between desirable professional conduct and
desirable nonprofessional or "ordinary" conduct. 1 33 For example, profes-
sional confidentiality obligations may limit one's responses to requested
129. KANT, supra note 45, at 46.
130. See D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 773, 783-84, 787, 795-98; Eberle, supra note 5, at 21
n.87. See also WILLIAM D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 20-24 (1930); Joel Feinberg, Civil
Disobedience in the Modern World, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 134 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds.,
3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Feinberg, Disobedience]. Prima facie principles are presumptions that
certain duties are morally required to be performed absent some compelling countervailing interest.
See Ross, supra, at 20. Whether such duties actually apply depends upon a considered evaluation of
all morally significant aspects of a given circumstance. Id.
131. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
132. WOLFRAM, supra note 28, at 73.
133. Id. at 76-77. The difference between professional and nonprofessional or ordinary morality
is referred to as ."role-differentiation." "Role-differentiation signifies that the ethical obligations
one undertakes as a lawyer are distinct from and supersede the ethical obligations one is under in
one's non-professional everyday life." Stier, supra note 81, at 553. Many defend a sharp distinction
between legal and ordinary ethics. Id. For example, one should consider the arguments of Professors
Freedman and Fried, supra note 3. By contrast, this article argues for closer integration of
professional ethics with the ordinary norms of morality.
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information. As an advocate or negotiator, a lawyer is not ordinarily
required to tell the other side all of what he knows or thinks about the
merits of his case. In contrast, one would behave differently towards
friends.1 34 Legal ethics requires lawyers to so prefer their clients' valid
claims, in the absence of more compelling claims. 1
35
Nevertheless, moral behavior is an important aspect of professional
responsibility. Like the other foundations, morality is a core set of ideas
comprising legal ethics. Professional responsibility standards capture these
ideas most clearly in the provisions covering confidentiality (especially the
exceptions to the obligation), 36 truthfulness, 37 fairness, 38 and advice
incorporating moral considerations. 
139
Much professional conduct, in fact, can usefully be guided through
application of ethical principles. For example, it is desirable to keep
promises, be truthful and honest, and not cheat or steal. Sadly, there is too
much blatant disregard of fundamental ethical norms and professional
responsibility rules. t4 In this way, the moral tension of practice might be
less than perceived; it may be easier to be a good lawyer and person than the
legal community assumes.'41
Moral philosophy can clarify reasoning in other ways, too. For example,
Kant's ethical theory may be useful to professional practice. He calls for
implementation of a critical reasoning methodology that subjects actions
and choices to a moral appraisal, requiring that one accept the critical moral
principle involved in the moral appraisal. This self-evaluation demands an
impartial point of view so that in formulating conduct one must consider
oneself as both agent and object of action, actor and subject. To be credible
in the Kantian sense, actions and judgments must be scrutinized to ensure
that they provide a basis for standards of conduct which are consistent,
134. Hazard, supra note 33, at 3-4.
135. McChrystal, supra note 36, at 415.
136. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6.
137. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 (requiring candor toward court); MODEL RULES Rule 4.1
(requiring truthfulness to third parties).
138. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.4 (requiring fairness to opposing party and counsel).
139. See MODEL RULES Rule 2.1.
140. One should note, for example, the flagrant misconduct observed by some legal interns in a
study conducted by Professor Hellman. Hellman, supra note 2, at 583 n. 165, 603-05 (discussing situa-
tions in which: lawyer lies to client to disguise own negligence; lawyer's negligence results in un-
necessary extra jail time for client; lawyer plans to mislead court as to identity of real client; lawyer
defending insurance case passes adverse confidential information about insured to insurance
company; lawyer plans to lie if caught in declining to disclose identity of doctors sought in valid
discovery request; lawyer counsels client to fabricate evidence; lawyer exacts sexual favors in lieu of
collecting fee); see also Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 663 (1990) ("Lawyers
deceive their clients more than is generally acknowledged by the ethics codes or by the bar.").
141. Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REV. 439, 460 (1990)
[hereinafter Morgan, Thinking].
1993]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
dispassionate, and universally applicable, at least to similarly situated
people.
142
Of course, it may not be feasible for lawyers, or any of us, to realize such
universal moral principles all the time, if at all. Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of Kant's theory is as an ideal toward which to aspire, should one so
choose. While striving for universal applicability, therefore, conduct should
be founded at least on a principled ethical justification, a more attainable
standard.143
This need to justify conduct provides a means by which responsibility can
be assumed for one's actions and choices, even in the professional role,
rather than hiding from it behind a professional mask. In this way, Kant's
theory provides a framework for making professional actions more congru-
ous with moral norms. Importantly, this provides a basis for a more
searching and principled justification for conduct.
Of course, law practice presents a range of moral choices. 44 Some
problems arising in practice call for straightforward application of ethical
principles, such as maintenance of confidentiality or desistance from lying
or committing fraud. Absent compelling countervailing circumstance, these
are easy cases to solve.
Useful solutions to other problems can be guided through fidelity to
constitutional rights, such as the due process guarantee of right to counsel
in criminal cases or, in that context, making the state prove its case against a
defendant. In this way, the due process right helps structure a lawyer's
thinking and conduct. The concept of due process also covers the problem
of "the last lawyer in town," obligating a lawyer to represent reprehensible
or undesirable clients regardless of a lawyer's personal misgivings about
taking such a case.
145
But other problems involve a complex of competing principles, values, or
142. The present author has previously sketched a Kantian deontological model of decisionmak-
ing that provides a framework for addressing moral values in practice, including a way to resolve
conflicts among prima facie moral values. See Eberle, supra note 5, at 12-20. Kant's theory has been
quite influential. WOLFRAM, supra note 28, at 72.
143. See Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 14-15 (citing Mashaw, Administrative Due
Process: The Quest fora Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 917 (1981)). See also, Stier, supra note
81, at 604 (stating that integrity depends on reasons for action).
144. "[S]eeing is a moral art." Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16, at 953 (internal quotations
omitted). One must learn to see that individuals have "moral choices every day ... [as] part of the
fabric of life." Id. (citing Shaffer, Belonging, supra note 101, at 70 and other work of Tom Shaffer).
JOHN DEWEY, THEORY OF VALUATION 29-33 (1939) (declaring that the most important human and
institutional choices are character-defining choices).
145. For example, one must consider defending the right of Nazis to assemble and demonstrate
for "white power" in Skokie, Illinois, a community heavily populated by Jewish survivors of the
Holocaust. See generally David Goldberger, Skokie: The First Amendment Under Attack by its Friends,
29 MERCER L. REV. 761 (1978); Morris L. Ernst & Alan U. Schwartz, The Right to Counsel and the
"Unpopular Cause", 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 725 (1959).
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interests, whether conflicting moral, autonomy, or community reasons.
These quandaries are among the most difficult to resolve satisfactorily. For
example, it is not easy to calibrate loyalty obligations when a client presents
a clear threat of danger to himself and others. Consider Hawkins v. King
County,1 46 where a man, Hawkins, "was mentally ill and of danger to himself
and others."4 7 Having been incarcerated for possession of marijuana, the
question for Hawkins's attorney was whether to seek Hawkins release from
custody, as he desired, or proceed to have him hospitalized or civilly
committed, as Hawkins's mother and a psychiatrist urged.
141
In situations like this, whose loyalty claims should take precedence - the
client's or those threatened with concrete harm (in Hawkins, the mother)?
Which moral claims take precedence - a lawyer's promise of confidential-
ity to his client or the duty to warn innocent third parties who are likely to be
harmed by the client even if the threat is communicated confidentially in the
professional relationship?
Questions like these are among the toughest of legal ethics. These
problems present dilemmas, where two or more ethical claims or principles
or other compelling interests conflict. In the face of such dilemmas, which
claim should prevail? How does one make a choice?
In the Hawkins case, the lawyer chose to prefer his client's interests over
the competing claims. Thus, he kept silent about the client's mental state at
the bail hearing. 149 He then successfully obtained Hawkins' release from
custody. 150 Later, Hawkins assaulted his mother and attempted suicide by
jumping off a bridge, causing serious injury to himself.'51
In problematic situations like Hawkins, it is necessary to analyze critically
the situation so that it may be resolved in an ethically satisfying manner.
Some lessons of moral philosophy may prove illuminating. W.D. Ross
argued that moral conflicts, as in Hawkins, can arise in deontological theory.
According to Ross, "it is incoherent to insist upon universal validity of any
one moral rule to the exclusion of all others.' '152 For example, the lawyer's
moral obligation to maintain his client's confidence cannot always displace
other competing moral values, such as the duty to warn innocent third
146. Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361, 365 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that lawyer's duty
of loyalty to client overrides disclosure of information of client's mental state, which made him
dangerous to himself and others).




151. Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361, 363 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
152. D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 773 (citing Ross, supra note 130).
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parties of imminent and serious harm. Instead, Ross' approach was to
recognize these moral conflicts and then seek to resolve them.
15 3
He viewed the problem as one of distributive justice, calling for the
distribution of goods according to moral worth. But "while the principle to
produce the most good ranks as a first principle, it is but one such principle
which must be balanced by intuition against the claims of the other prima
facie principles."15' 4 Accordingly, when presented with a conflict between
competing moral (or, as appropriate, autonomy or community) claims one
must try to find a "constructive answer... to the problem of assigning
weights to competing principles of justice."' 55 Ross suggests we consider the
situation as carefully and fully as possible until we form a "considered
opinion.., that in the circumstances one [duty] ... is more incumbent than
any other."' 56 While considered reflection may be "highly fallible ... it is
the only guide we have to our duty." '157
John Rawls characterized this approach as "intuitionism." By intuition-
ism, Rawls meant a doctrine containing "an irreducible family of first
principles which have to be weighed against one another by asking ourselves
which balance, in our considered judgment, is the most just.'' 5 8
Still, the obvious danger here is that principled results may not be
obtained simply by applying "intuitionism" to the resolution of moral
conflicts. In our world there is almost always a "plurality of principles"
which must be balanced in determining which single principle in the
plurality is "most just." This balancing inevitably requires the exercise of
judgment.
But the problem is not irreducible. 15' Reliance on intuitionism can be
reduced "by posing more limited questions and by substituting prudential
for [unguided] moral judgment."' 6 ° This focuses the appeal to intuition,
"substitut[ing] for an ethical judgment, a judgment of rational prudence., 161
Or consider what Aristotle called phronesis - "practical wisdom" or
"sound judgment., 162 By such practical reason or judgment, Aristotle
153. Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 16.
154. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 40 (1971) (citing Ross, supra note 130, at 21-27). (Ross'
theory is a deontological intuitionist theory.)
155. Id. at 40.
156. Ross, supra note 130, at 19.
157. Id. at 42.
158. RAWLS, supra note 154, at 34. Here, Rawls views intuitionism "in a more general way than is
customary." Id.
159. Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 19.
160. RAWLS, supra note 154, at 44.
161. Id.
162. VI ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 153, Glossary 312 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
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means a careful deliberation upon the range of factors relevant to a
problem, imaginably conceived.' 63 A powerful imagination will yield a wider
range of factors to be considered, adding further dimensions to solution of
the problem.' 64 Such careful deliberation requires both sympathy with
interests one prefers (in the case of lawyers, client interests) and a certain
measure of detachment so that the problem can be viewed more objec-
tively. 165
Such prudential or practical reasoning can help resolve moral conflicts or
ethical problems generally. In the case of conflicts between moral prin-
ciples, such reasoning can help determine which principle or principles are
most just. In the Hawkins case, for example, disclosure of imminent con-
crete harm to identified victims should take precedence over confidentiality
if that is the only way to prevent the harm.1 66 Where moral principles clash
with nonmoral values, moral principles should presumptively prevail. When
nonmoral values or interests conflict, such practical reasoning can help
guide the reasons to be preferred.
Ultimately, a lawyer must pick the reason or set of reasons to act upon.
Upon careful deliberation, however, there is greater likelihood that the
judgments reached will be judicious and reasoned. This requires intuitive
comprehension and skill in "forming... these judgments about specific
problems.' 167
Like "prudence" or wisdom in everyday affairs, this reasoning is better
demonstrated than described.'68 It displays itself in the judgments reached
in particular cases. In this way, prudential or practical reasoning seems well
suited to the case-centered work of lawyers.
169
Other problems of legal practice are, in fact, morally ambiguous. For
example, it is not at all clear whether a lawyer should or should not
''cross-examine a truthful and accurate witness to make her appear to be
163. Anthony T. Kronman, Practical Wisdom and Professional Character, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL. 203,
206-07, 216-17, 225 (1986).
164. Id. at 225 ("[I]magination is the root of practical wisdom, and the lawyer who possesses a
powerful imagination will not only be able to conceive a wider range of solutions to the problems he
confronts but will be more inclined as well to make those choices that we think of as being judicious
or practically wise."). "[C]reative, normatively charged judgment is the distinctive ethical compo-
nent of the ideal of professionalism." William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 65, 66 (1991) [hereinafter Simon, Trouble].
165. Kronman, supra note 163, at 213-14.
166. Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 19-37 (describing and applying such prudential
or practical reasoning to resolution of such moral quandaries).
167. Kronman, supra note 163, at 206.
168. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 1615, 1647 (1987).
169. Kronman, supra note 163, at 207. See infra Part Ill., infra, (demonstrating an application of
this reasoning).
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mistaken .... Certainly, a lawyer's loyalty to clients requires zealous
pursuit of the case. On the other hand, how one treats adversaries is an
important ethical concern. The demands of the concrete case may well
determine the proper balance.
Still other practice problems are without moral significance. For example,
summoning a witness to court, even at inconvenience, does not ordinarily
implicate morality. Or consider corporate law practice, much of which does
not implicate value questions. Instead, studies indicate such practice con-
sists mainly of technical tasks, like corporate governance, structuring busi-
ness transactions, or compliance with regulatory agencies. 71
Nevertheless, many professional responsibility problems present moral
issues that call for choices to be made. This requires that we prioritize the
values at issue. How we make these choices says a lot about who we are. Our
integrity depends on our reasons for action. Our choices, in turn, give
authority to ethics, the art of deciding what to do under the circum-
stances. 172
2. Connection to Autonomy
An important connection between morality and autonomy is that moral-
ity depends on autonomy, the free exercise of choice. All moral decisions
must partake of such autonomy. 173 Such freedom, in turn, makes for
self-realization. This facilitates assumption of responsibility for one's choices
and actions, a key goal of moral theory. In these ways, moral autonomy
promotes the inherent dignity and freedom of persons.
Additionally, many of the freedoms contained in our Bill of Rights
themselves embody moral ideas. One should consider, for example, due
process fairness and freedoms of expression and conscience.174 These
freedoms enlarge the moral quality of dignity and autonomy that can be
achieved, individually and collectively.
Nevertheless, while autonomy and morality are connected in ways, they
are also in tension with one another. Unrestrained autonomy is egoistic,
where "the good of the individual, as defined by the individual, is the
170. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 161.
171. See ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 160-65 (1969); Heinz, supra note 5, at 891,
902-03; R. Nelson, supra note 1, at 557.
172. See Shaffer, Babel, supra note 101, at 1001 ("What gives authority to morals in our lives.., is
that we have chosen them.").
173. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 48 (stating that "human autonomy is a fundamental moral
concept"); Gerald Dworkin, Moral Autonomy, in 3 MORALS SCIENCE AND SOCIALITY 156, 160 (H.
Tristam Englehardt, Jr. & Daniel Callahan eds., 1978) ("A moral agent must retain autonomy, must
make his own moral choices.").
174. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 15, 22, 166.
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paramount goal. 175 Any philosophy that allows unrestrained behavior by
individuals is not moral because it allows everyone to advance their interests
as they please. In this way, the "autonomy" model of legal ethics can easily
constitute "surrogate egoism," where a lawyer acts on behalf of a client's
unbridled egoism.
176
Whether autonomous choices are moral or not, therefore, depends on
their moral quality. Focusing on the moral quality of autonomy, then, one
must evaluate the choices made. These choices call for a dispassionate,
critical moral assessment in the manner described above.' 7 7 Accordingly in
legal ethics, lawyers should evaluate the objectives of the clients they choose
to represent and the means by which such objectives are carried out.
In these ways, morality is connected to autonomy, and autonomy to
morality. Rather than being mutually exclusive, they too can generate
mutually compatible reasons for conduct.
3. Connection to Community
Like autonomy, morality helps give definition to character and, more
broadly, community. On character, morality helps define one's present and
future character. For example, moral ideas instruct us to be truthful, loyal,
faithful, courageous, and tolerant, among other virtues.
Morality is also a focus on others as well as self. Morality requires that
one treat others as one would like to be treated, and not treat others in ways
one would find intolerable were the situation reversed. Morality also
requires one to behave in accordance with rules of conduct equally appli-
cable to all similarly situated and precludes one from fashioning exceptions
for one's own choices, actions, and conduct. 178 How one treats oneself, and
others, speaks genuinely as to the content of society's collective character.
In these ways, morality is an important foundation for character.
Character is likewise crucial to morality. Professional responsibility is not
just a set of ethically prescribed choices.17 9 Lawyers must also make
decisions on how to act in a given circumstance. This requires a capacity for
sound judgment and practical wisdom, a process of imagination, careful
deliberation, and intuitive comprehension., 8 ° In this way, lawyers form and
prove their character.
175. D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 31, at 798.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
178. Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 16. See also supra notes 140-41 and accompany-
ing text.
179. Ian Johnstone & Mary P. Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An Overview of Teaching
Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 80 (1991).
180. Kronman, supra note 99, at 846-61 (describing process of deliberation and judgment); See
also supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
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With regard to community, morality is a primary source of the ideas that
inspire people to group together and share a common experience. These
ideas, in turn, provide definition and content to community. In achieving a
desirable community, one could reliably look to constitute it with ethical
norms, like fidelity, gratitude, non-maleficence, beneficence, maintenance
of promises and confidentially, honesty, truthfulness, not committing fraud
or cheating, and upholding the integrity of a just legal system. One would
also look to a community committed to the principle of justice which, in
turn, helps guarantee that a community will more effectively realize it by
remaining fair and open to all, treating similarly situated persons in
essentially similar manners, and realizing substantive justice.
In these ways, morality and community draw on one another. As rights
can be compatible with virtues, therefore, virtues are indeed compatible
with morals.
D. CONCLUSION
Having emphasized the connections among the three dominant founda-
tions of legal ethics, a clear central ethical core to the discipline emerges,
one drawn from and supported by each foundation. Central and clear ideas
drawn from autonomy include self-determination, self-realization, loyalty,
dignity, and equality, including access to a complete set of rights; from
community comes character, virtue, well-being, and a range of obligations,
including those to others, to our system of law, and to society; from morality
comes fidelity, non-maleficence, beneficence, truthfulness, honesty, justice,
and assumption of personal responsibility for life, including professional
life. These concepts complement one another.
Each foundation thereby integrates into the others, forming an overlap-
ping conceptual consensus. No one foundation is exclusive. While au-
tonomy is not an exclusive foundation of legal ethics, neither is community
nor morality. This integration brings more balance, stability, and clarity to
the central conceptions of the profession. It also provides a certain struc-
ture, coherence, and substance to its underlying ethical base. In these ways,
a central ethical core to the profession may be forged, illuminating the area
within which lawyers ought to dwell.
From this vantage point, therefore, lawyers can more soundly reason and
reliably structure advice and conduct. First, the integrated approach illumi-
nates the central obligations of the profession. Central and clear problems
of professional responsibility can thus be more easily solved. Second, the
approach brings professional responsibility more in line with its underlying
aspirations, ameliorating the dissonance between what attracts people to
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the profession and its reality. 8 ' Third, the approach enables lawyers to
draw upon a more complete set of concepts to apply to the concrete
problems of their clients. The dialogue between lawyers and clients can thus
be richer and more enlightening as compared to confining discussion to a set
of ideas drawn from any one foundation. In reasoning through problems
and rendering advice, therefore, lawyers are more likely to address the full
range of interests implicated in cases, leading to more sensible solutions.
Fourth, the approach facilitates a more comprehensive relationship be-
tween lawyers and their clients, involving the full persons of both clients and
lawyers in a cooperative, interdependent enterprise. Dissonance between
professional and private life can thereby be lessened.
Having integrated each dominant foundation into the ethical core of the
profession, the next step is to implement this approach. This calls for
integration too - of oneself and the professional role. A good reader
integrates herself into the professional role, combining legal, moral, and
prudential reasons into advice and conduct, acting as a good person would
act. 182
Ideally, of course, lawyers should empower clients to achieve autonomy in
an ethical manner within the context of a just community. Inevitably,
however, the demands of concrete cases call for accommodation of this
ideal. This calls for integrity of character, good sense, and prudential
judgment. In short, one must reason or learn to reason carefully, soundly
applying the conceptions in the proper proportion, a process better demon-
strated than described. Ultimately, solution of the concrete case is the acid
test for deciding what to do. In these ways the path of a good lawyer is
forged. Part III illustrates how these goals can be accomplished in two
representative cases, subornation of perjury in criminal cases, and solution
of problematic moral dilemmas in civil cases.
III. APPLYING THE INTEGRATED APPROACH
Application of an integrated approach to legal ethics can resolve more
satisfactorily professional responsibility questions. There are several ben-
efits to this approach. First, by crystallizing the central conceptions of the
profession, solutions to central and clear problems are better illuminated.
Second, by facilitating use of a more complete set of ideas in the dialogue
between attorneys and their clients, difficult, problematic professional
situations can more satisfactorily be resolved. More perspectives can be
applied to the problem than would be the case if only a single foundation
181. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; Johnson, supra note 4; Simon, Trouble, supra note
164, at 65 ("The reason that legal ethics is so consistently disappointing is that the prevailing
conceptions of the subject fail to respond to the aspirations that draw people to it.").
182. Stier, supra note 81, at 555-58, 566-67.
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were used. This helps clarify cases on the outer bound. Third, by involving
the full persons of attorneys and clients in this enterprise, it is more likely
that sensible solutions will follow. In these ways, the integrated approach
maps out the area within which lawyers ought to dwell.
These goals are demonstrated by applying the integrated approach to two
well-known cases. Resolution of central, fundamental problems is illus-
trated through examination of Nix v. Whiteside,183 where an attorney to a
murder defendant successfully dissuaded his client from falsely testifying to
a crucial fact that might have established the defendant's innocence. 84 Nix
illustrates how a firm conception of the professional role can illuminate
resolution of a lawyer's duties to promote loyalty his client's interests in an
ethical manner consistent with the law, demonstrating how duties to client,
society, and conscience can properly be balanced.
Resolution of difficult, borderline cases is illustrated through examina-
tion of the second case, Spaulding v. Zimmerman,' 85 the well-known di-
lemma of a twenty year old man who has suffered a life-threatening
aneurysm, arguably from an automobile accident, that has been discovered
by defendant's counsel but, as yet, remains unknown to the man or his
counsel. 86 Spaulding illustrates how the integrated approach can be used to
resolve problematic quandaries that arise in practice. The central question
explored in this analysis is what a good lawyer should do in circumstances of
moral complexity.
A. CENTRAL AND CLEAR SOLUTIONS: NIX V. WHITESIDE
1. Statement of the case
Nix is a paradigm of the autonomy set of ideas, here of an individual
threatened with loss of personal liberty because of alleged participation in a
murder crime. The defendant, Whiteside, "was convicted of second-degree
murder by a jury.' 87 The issue of relevance to Whiteside was his claim of
self-defense, based on his statement that he stabbed the victim, Love, to
death because Love "was pulling a pistol from underneath the pillow on the
bed."'' 8 However, "no pistol was found on the premises" by the police in
their search.' 89 When questioned by defendant's attorney, Robinson,
defendant's companions, who were present at the stabbing, stated that none
183. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
184. Id. at 161-62.
185. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
186. Id. at 706.
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had seen a gun during the incident.'9 ° Robinson advised Whiteside that the
existence of a gun was not necessary to establish a claim of self-defense and
that only a reasonable belief that the victim had a gun was required.1 9'
In preparation for trial, Whiteside told attorney Robinson consistently
that he had not actually seen a gun in Love's hand, but had believed that the
victim had one.' 92 Love had a reputation for carrying guns. t93 About a week
before trial, Whiteside for the first time told Robinson that he had seen
something "metallic" in Love's hand.19 4 When asked further about this,
Whiteside responded, "if I don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead.' 9 5
Robinson did not believe Whiteside's revised account and he told White-
side that such testimony would be perjury.' 96 He repeated his advice that it
was not necessary to prove that a gun was available but only that Whiteside
reasonably believed that he was in danger.' 97 When Whiteside insisted that
he would testify that he saw "something-metallic," Robinson told him:
we could not allow him to [testify falsely] because that would be perjury,
and as officers of the court we would be suborning perjury if we allowed
him to do it... I advised him that if he did do that it would be my duty to
advise the Court of what he was doing and that I felt he was committing




192. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 160 (1986).
193. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1325 (8th Cir. 1984).
194. Nix, 475 U.S. at 161.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Nix. v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 161 (1986).
198. Id. Significantly, in Nix the Supreme Court gave the state court's "factual finding that
Whiteside would have committed perjury had he testified at trial actually to having seen a gun ... a
presumption of correctness." Id. at 180 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Iowa Supreme Court found
that Robinson was "convinced with good cause to believe" that Whiteside's testimony would be
false. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit concluded that Robinson had a "firm factual basis for believing" that Whiteside's
testimony would be false. Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713, 714 (8th Cir. 1984). It thus seems
reasonable to conclude that Robinson believed Whiteside intended to commit perjury, as the
Supreme Court implicitly concluded. Nix, 475 U.S. at 166. This makes Nix a relatively easy case, as
compared to situations of contemplated perjury where evidence establishing the falsehood is much
less clear.
On the other hand, in view of Whiteside's conflicting stories and the fact he did not admit that the
proposed testimony was false, one could yet conclude that it was not "beyond a reasonable doubt
that the testimony was false." Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some
Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939, 1941 (1988) [hereinafter Freedman, Client
Confidences]. In this article, Professor Freedman examines in detail the Nix record. In view of these
considerations, some courts have insisted upon a "clearly established" or "actual knowledge" or
"firm factual basis" standard of anticipated perjury. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436,
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Robinson also indicated he would attempt to withdraw from the representa-
tion if Whiteside insisted on committing perjury.' 99
At trial, Whiteside testified in his own defense, stating that he "knew"
Love had a gun and that he believed Love was reaching for a gun, causing
him to act quickly in self-defense.2 0 1 On cross-examination, he admitted he
had not actually seen a gun in Love's hand. 20 ' Robinson presented evidence
to show a basis for Whiteside's asserted fear that Love had a gun.202 After
the jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder, Whiteside moved for a
new trial on the ground he was denied a fair trial by Robinson's "admoni-
tions not to state that he saw a gun or 'something metallic.' ,,203 This motion
was denied.20 4
Nix presents a classic trilemma of conflicting professional duties to client,
court, and conscience. How we resolve these conflicts reveals our true
priorities, 2°5 putting our conceptions to the acid test of experience as we
decide what to do. Prior to resolving this case, it is worth exploring the ideas
implicated.
2. Autonomy
Nix implicates most of the classic autonomy ideas. Indeed, few interests
are as compelling as personal freedom, the stake for Whiteside. To protect
this freedom, Whiteside was entitled to assistance of counsel to defend
himself. Crucial autonomy ideas implicated include access to our regime of
constitutional rights, especially due process and Sixth Amendment right to
counsel guarantees. Assisting others to understand their rights is morally
worthwhile. 2 6 Exercise of rights, in turn, aids vindication of individual
dignity. 2 7 These rights also help preserve liberty by checking government,
here in holding the state to its burden of proof prior to incarcerating
444 (8th Cir. 1988); Doe v. Federal Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1988). Certainly a
lawyer must use extreme caution in deciding that a client will commit perjury.
199. Nix, 475 U.S. at 161.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 161-62.
202. Nixv. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 162 (1986).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 161-62. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Whiteside's conviction. State v. Whiteside,
272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978). Whiteside then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court of the Southern District of Iowa. The District Court denied the writ. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and directed that the
writ of habeas corpus be granted, Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1325 (1984), leading to the
Supreme Court case.
205. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 10.
206. Fried, supra note 3, at 1075.
207. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The role of the
defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument and defender of the client's
autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal process.").
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persons accused of crimes. Finally, these rights help assure that justice is
maintained.
In acting as counsel, Robinson drew upon further autonomy ideas. He
provided access to the law, including the options arising with respect to it,
and the consequences of those choices. He explained all information
relevant to the case, thereby aiding Whiteside to make informed decisions
about his affairs. He also kept confidential all information learned in the
representation, and zealously, loyally, and competently represented
Whiteside's interests, including presentation of exculpatory evidence. In
these ways, he helped Whiteside achieve his due in this matter.
The most important choice to make, of course, was what to do concerning
the contemplated perjury. In explaining the law on this point, Robinson did
not patronize or coerce Whiteside but instead told it like it was.2" 8 Candor is
essential to lawyering, as truth is indispensable in deciding what to do.
Reasonably convinced that the testimony would constitute perjury, Robin-
son told Whiteside that use of this testimony was against the law. 0 9 As an
attorney, Robinson could not condone such use. If Whiteside did perjure
himself, Robinson felt obligated to advise the court of the falsehood. In
these ways, Robinson treated Whiteside as an independent moral agent,
capable of deciding for himself what to do. Whatever Whiteside did,
therefore, would determine his own fate. Any claim of prejudice in the case
might thus reasonably be attributable to his actions z"0
Perhaps if Robinson did not himself believe the testimony to be perjuri-
ous, other strategies may have been possible. For example, in view of
Whiteside's conflicting stories and the fact he did not admit that the
proposed testimony was false, perhaps Robinson could have presented the
testimony to the jury and allowed it to determine whether the testimony was
false beyond a reasonable doubt.2 "' Alternatively, Robinson could have
relied on Whiteside's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
since "the government cannot enforce a rule requiring a lawyer to reveal her
client's confidences regarding the client's perjury., 21 2 Any of these choices
call for careful consideration of the relevant issues and principled justifica-
tion.
Importantly, Robinson's choice was justifiable and "within the wide range
of professional responses to threatened client perjury. 2 13 In fact, good
ethics makes good strategy here. Few would believe Whitehead's falsehood
in the context of the evidence establishing the crime. One could reasonably
208. Pepper, Autonomy, supra note 16, at 946.
209. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 161 (1986).
210. Pizzimenti, supra note 30, at 462.
211. Freedman, Client Confidences, supra note 198, at 1941.
212. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 135 (citing Fisher v. United States, 427 U.S. 367 (1976)).
213. Nix, 475 U.S. at 166.
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expect that cross-examination would uncover the contemplated false-
hood."1 4 In this way, Robinson's strategy probably saved Whiteside from the
harm of the lie being exposed.2t 5
Whiteside did not like what he heard. The law can be both empowering
and limiting. Properly advised of the consequences of committing perjury,
however, Whiteside chose not to so testify.21 6 In this way, Robinson
empowered Whiteside to make a meaningful choice about his life.
3. Community
The foremost idea traceable to community was Robinson's obligation as
officer of the court to uphold the integrity of the law and its institutions,
which Whiteside's desire to commit perjury directly challenged. 1 7 Crucial
to fulfillment of this obligation was Robinson's character. Having recog-
nized these interests of the law at stake, the key question became what to
214. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 138 ("A panel on lawyers' ethics was once asked what the
defense lawyer should do when a client proposes to commit perjury. 'Do me a favor,' a United States
Attorney on the panel replied, 'Let him try it.' "). It is not clear that Robinson so advised Whiteside.
215. Indeed, cross-examination uncovered that Whiteside "had not actually seen a gun in Love's
hand" in response to his testimony that "he 'knew' that Love had a gun and that he believed Love
was reaching for a gun." Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 161-62 (1986).
216. Professor Freedman finds Whiteside's choice on this point coerced by Robinson's threat to
reveal the perjury. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 133; Freedman, Client Confidences, supra note 198, at
1940-41.
However, if one accepts the Supreme Court's conclusion that Robinson had good cause to believe
that Whiteside would commit perjury, Nix, 475 U.S. at 180, then perjury is simply beyond the law
and, therefore, a choice constrained by legal limits. This appears to be the basis on which the
Supreme Court decided the case:
Whether Robinson's conduct is seen as a successful attempt to dissuade his client from
committing the crime of perjury, or whether seen as a "threat" to withdraw from
representation and disclose the illegal scheme, Robinson's representation of Whiteside
falls well within accepted standards of professional conduct and the range of reasonable
professional conduct acceptable under Strickland.
Id. at 171 (citations omitted). Of course, one might view the law as "coercive" in the sense that it
directs compliance with its mandates, even in relation to the "bad man." See supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
217. One could also view Nix as Professor Freedman does, as presenting the duty to uphold
constitutional rights (here Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights), certainly an integral part of the
integrity of our system of law. See supra note 198. Indeed,
lawyers make their greatest contribution by their willingness to stand apart from a
particular community and to operate by different rules, so that the integrity of the legal
system may be protected. In other words, the role of the lawyer is to assure that society's
system for justice is maintained and is available to provide an essential component which
holds the society together.
Wells, Toward a Kinder, Gentler, Legal Profession, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 967, 982 (1990).
The collision between a constitutional right and another prima facie norm, like the moral duty not
to commit a lie in Nix, calls for quite careful assessment and resolution. Different choices and
resolutions are possible. Required, however, is the foundation of choice on a principled basis.
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do. Robinson chose without hesitation to act as a good reader of the law
would act, fairly reading and applying the law even when in limitation of his
client's interests.21 8
How Robinson acted had significance beyond himself. His conduct also
affected others. Robinson acted with awareness of the broader conse-
quences of his conduct, demonstrating professional character and courage,
serving as an example for other professionals to emulate in similar circum-
stances. In this way, Robinson formed an important connection to the legal
community. He also formed an important connection to the lay community
by demonstrating the power and limitation of the law. This might especially
influence others in the respect they accord the law.2 19 In these ways,
Robinson participated in the normative life of community, helping make
and mold it.
4. Morality
Nix also implicated important moral ideas. Affirmative presentation of
false evidence is prohibited by prima facie moral norms, like obligations to
be truthful, to not misrepresent information, and to not lie or commit or
suborn perjury. Besides being moral wrongs, these are also debilitating to
the legal system. There is a public interest in seeing justice realized.2 0
Other ideas traceable to morality include Robinson's fidelity to Whiteside,
his preservation of Whiteside's confidences, and provision of access to the
law so that Whiteside could exercise meaningfully his autonomy.
5. Solution
Having explicated the ideas drawn from each foundation of legal ethics,
the next relevant step is their application. The central focus here is
ascertaining a bound of autonomy as limited by community and morality.
Concretely, Nix tests a limit on a lawyer's duty to advance client interests, as
enforced by duties to comply with the law and adhere to professional and
moral standards of conduct.
Focusing first on Robinson's ethical duty to advance Whiteside's inter-
ests, it is worth recognizing how clearly Robinson understood and per-
formed this duty. He acted zealously, competently, diligently, loyally, and
fairly on behalf of Whiteside. He presented evidence tending "to show a
basis for Whiteside's asserted fear that Love had a gun '22 ' but would not
present the testimony that Whiteside had actually seen the gun despite
218. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
219. Morgan, Evolving, supra note 3, at 705-06.
220. Id.
221. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 162 (1986).
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Whiteside's desire that he do so, because Robinson reasonably believed this
testimony to be false and therefore beyond the law.22 2 In short, he empow-
ered Whiteside to his full entitlement of rights under the law.
Central to Robinson's evaluation of Whiteside's case was that it was not
resolvable solely by resort to the autonomy foundation. Equally compelling
were obligations to comply with the law and standards of professional
responsibility, traceable to the community and morality foundations. These
obligations limited what Robinson could do for Whiteside, however loyal
and zealous Robinson desired to be. Of course, from Whiteside's stand-
point, anything might be permissible to achieve his freedom, even lying or
the commission of perjury. In this spot, there is no telling what any of us
might do. But as a professional, Robinson faced compelling community and
moral obligations, which in this case limited autonomy.
Looking beyond autonomy to community, Robinson's dilemma became
apparent. As an officer of the court, Robinson was under a positive
obligation not to present perjured testimony or suborn its use. These duties
underlie the integrity of the legal system, even if in limitation of client
interests.
These standards confirm that the legal profession has accepted that an
attorney's ethical duty to advance the interests of his client is limited by an
equally solemn duty to comply with the law and standards of professional
conduct; it specifically ensures that the client may not use false evidence.
This special duty of an attorney to prevent and disclose frauds upon the
court derives from the recognition that perjury is as much a crime as
tampering with witnesses or jurors by way of promises and threats, and
.... [A]lthough counsel must take all reasonable lawful means to attain
the objectives of the client, counsel is precluded from taking steps or in
any way assisting the client in presenting false evidence or otherwise
violating the law. This principle has consistently been recognized in most
unequivocal terms by expositors of the norms of professional conduct
since the first Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1908.223
Robinson's ethical duty to advance Whiteside's interests was also con-
strained by moral norms, including duties to be truthful, to not misrepresent
information, and to not lie or commit perjury. These are personal obliga-
tions that speak to Robinson's character. In resolving what to do, Robinson
needed to determine his priorities. He needed to critically self-evaluate
himself, impartially and dispassionately, considering himself as both actor
222. Id. at 161.
223. Id. at 166, 168. Today this standard is codified in MODEL CODE DR 7-102 and MODEL RULES
Rule 3.3.
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and subject.2 24 In so scrutinizing himself, he decided on conduct that could
serve as a standard for others similarly situated: "we could not allow him to
[testify falsely] because that would be perjury, and as officers of the court we
would be suborning perjury if we allowed him to do it."'2 25
These professional and moral obligations took precedence over Robinson's
loyalty to his client, Robinson decided. This decision took honesty and
courage - honesty in fairly reading the law and courage in so acting to
apply it. After all, the decision was less clear cut than it seems. Other
responses were possible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit concluded, for example, that a writ of habeas corpus could have
been granted in Whiteside's favor on the ground that "Robinson's admoni-
tion to Whiteside that he would inform the court of Whiteside's perjury
constituted a threat to violate the attorney's duty to preserve client confi-
dences . . . [and] breached ... standards of effective representation., 226
In view of these countervailing legal and moral obligations, Robinson's
ability to advance Whiteside's interests was bounded. Whatever the scope
of Whiteside's autonomy, it "does not extend to testifying falsely" the
Supreme Court concluded. 227 It is "crystal clear that there is no right
whatever - constitutional or otherwise - for a defendant to use false
evidence., 228 Therefore, Whiteside was not forced "into an impermissible
choice between his right to counsel and his right to testify as he proposed for
there was no permissible choice to testify falsely., 22 9 The Supreme Court
wisely illuminated the lawyer's role in this situation. Lawyers confronted
with similar problems can look to Nix, and Robinson, for guidance.
Given Robinson's clear understanding of the central conceptions consti-
tuting law practice, his solution was actually quite straightforward. Perjury
is simply impermissible. In actuality, there was no "conflict" between
autonomy and the other foundations. Rather, properly understood, au-
224. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
225. Nix, 475 U.S. at 161.
226. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 163 (1986). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit believed that Robinson's threat of disclosure of the contemplated perjury "creates a
chilling effect which inhibits the mutual trust and independence necessary to effective
representation." Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir. 1984). Of course, a client's
intention to commit perjury is a well-recognized, though controversial and unsettled exception to
confidentiality obligations. Compare MODEL CODE DR 7-102(B) with MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 (while
DR 7-102(B) instructs the attorney to reveal a client's fraud provided the information is not
privileged, Model Rule 3.3 has no analogous provision). The Eighth Circuit's reasoning is in line with
the approach of Professor Freedman. See supra notes 198-207 and accompanying text. Professor
Freedman, in reliance on the Fifth and Sixth Amendment, would prefer to present the testimony for
the jury to decide beyond reasonable doubt.
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tonomy was bounded by these countervailing social and moral norms. Thus,
when Robinson advised Whiteside, he explained his obligations as a moral
person and officer of the law. Robinson did not coerce Whiteside not to
testify perjuriously. Rather, he explained the law and his obligations as an
officer thereof were Whiteside to so testify. In particular, Robinson ex-
plained his decision on what he would do if Whiteside testified perjuriously.
So informed, Whiteside decided not to testify that he saw a gun. Like
Robinson, he made his own decision. Both Robinson and Whiteside were
independent moral agents faced with important decisions, the proper
stance in lawyer-client relationships. Each was responsible for their deci-
sion. Although each may not have been satisfied fully with the other's
decision, each came to respect the other's boundary.
Of course, if Whiteside had insisted upon testifying perjuriously, or if he
had actually so testified, Nix would have been a far more complicated case.
While it is universally agreed that a lawyer's first duty is to attempt to
dissuade a client from committing perjury, not all lawyers are as successful
as Robinson. In situations of anticipated or actual perjury, the next step is
far from clear. The conflict between a client's constitutional rights and a
lawyer's ethical duties is pronounced. That, however, is another topic,
beyond the scope of this article.23
From the broader standpoint of legal ethics, a similarly clear conception
of the professional role can yield like easy solutions. For example, the
integrated approach can readily solve cases like intentions to bribe or
threaten witnesses or jurors, mentioned by the Court,23 ' or using perjurious
witnesses, appropriating money from or overbilling clients, deceiving, or not
informing them, or acting dishonestly, among many other cases not men-
tioned by the Court. Most central and clear problems of legal ethics are
readily resolvable given a clear understanding of the conceptions constitut-
ing the professional role. In this way, the inner core of legal ethics is
obvious, mapping out a clear area in which lawyers should dwell.
230. See FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 129-41; Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in Criminal Cases:
Still in Search of an Answer, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (1988). Indeed, issues still left unanswered
by Nix are: (1) "what standard of knowing must a lawyer meet before acting on the conclusion that
the client's testimony will be perjurious;" (2) "what should a lawyer do in a case of actual or
anticipated perjury;" and (3) "whether the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
implicated when a lawyer divulges or threatens to divulge incriminating lawyer-client confidences to
the court." Freedman, Client Confidences, supra note 198, at 1939-40. On the other hand, the
importance of Nix is in illuminating what a lawyer can do consistent with the Constitution and
ethical standards when a client reasonably indicates that he intends to commit perjury. In short, Nix
illustrates how a sound choice can be made by a good person.
231. Nixv. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174 (1986).
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B. MORAL DILEMMAS: SPAULDING V. ZIMMERMAN
1. Statement of the case
Spaulding v. Zimmerman232 presents the reverse of Nix: a problematic
situation of acute moral complexity which few of us would desire to
encounter. David Spaulding sustained serious injuries in an automobile
accident.2 33 He was a passenger in a car driven by John Zimmerman, the
defendant in the case.2 34 After the accident, his injuries were diagnosed by
his family doctor "as a severe crushing injury of the chest with multiple rib
fractures; a severe cerebral concussion, probably with petechial hemor-
rhages of the brain; and bilateral fractures of the clavicles., 235 X-rays
revealed that "the heart and aorta [were] normal ' 236 A neurological
examination also disclosed no aortic aneurysm.237
In the meantime, at defendant Zimmerman's request, Spaulding was
examined by another neurologist, Dr. Hannah. In his report to Zimmerman's
attorney, Dr. Hannah stated:
The one feature of the case which bothers me more than any other part of
the case is the fact that this boy of 20 years of age has an aneurysm, which
means a dilatation of the aorta and the arch of the aorta. Whether this
came out of this accident I cannot say with any degree of certainty and I
have discussed it with the Roentgenologist and a couple of Internists ....
Of course an aneurysm or dilatation of the aorta in a boy of this age is a
serious matter as far as his life. This aneurysm may dilate further and it
might rupture with further dilatation and this would cause his death. It
would be interesting also to know whether the X-ray of his lungs, taken
immediately following the accident, shows this dilatation or not. If it was
not present immediately following the accident and is now present, then
we could be sure that it came out of the accident.238
When the trial began, the parties possessed only such information
concerning Spaulding's physical condition as each respective's medical
examiner had reported.239
It is thus apparent that neither David nor his father, the nominal plaintiff
in the prior action, was then aware that David was suffering the aorta
232. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962)
233. Id. at 706.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 707.
236. Id.
237. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1962).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 708.
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aneurysm but on the contrary believed that he was recovering from the
injuries sustained in the accident. 240
The next day settlement was reached on this information.
24
'
Two years later Spaulding had a physical exam, as required by the army
reserve, of which he was a member.242 This time the family physician
discovered the aorta aneurysm.243
He then reexamined the X rays which had been taken shortly after the
accident and at this time discovered that they disclosed the beginning of
the process which produced the aneurysm. He promptly sent David to Dr.
Jerome Grismer for an examination and opinion. The latter confirmed the
finding of the aorta aneurysm and recommended immediate surgery
therefor. This was performed by him at Mount Sinai Hospital in Minne-
apolis on March 10, 244
Spaulding then instituted a suit to vacate the prior settlement, requesting
additional damages "due to the more serious injuries including the aorta
aneurysm" allegedly resulting from the accident.2 45 This suit was successful,
resulting in the original settlement being set aside.2 46
The focus of the present analysis is on the conduct of defendant
Zimmerman's lawyers 247 who possessed the knowledge of Spaulding's
life-threatening condition but nevertheless concealed it at the time of the
original settlement.2 48 The question is whether this is how a good attorney
should act. Would an integrated approach to legal ethics make a difference?
Prior to answering these questions, let us explicate the ideas implicated in
Spaulding.
2. Autonomy
The autonomy ideas implicated in Spaulding are representative of most
civil cases. Zimmerman's attorneys were zealous advocates for his case,
loyally promoting his interests. They acted competently, diligently, dis-
cretely, trustworthily, and, according to the court, in "good faith," although








246. Id. at 709.
247. The attorneys for defendant John Zimmerman were Messrs. Field, Arveson & Donoho.
Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1962).
248. Id. at 709.
249. Id. at 709. The attorneys' conduct in withholding disclosure of Spaulding's medical condition
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Assuming they were competent attorneys, they would have discussed
Spaulding's medical condition with Zimmerman. They would have pointed
out the implications of the medical findings for Zimmerman's case and
awaited his direction as to what to do. It is essential that lawyers bring out
all information relevant to a case and that they explore the goals to be
accomplished with their clients. Only then can clients comment wisely about
the case, offer their perspective, and make an informed decision about what
to do.25° In these ways, they would properly have respected and promoted
their client's autonomy.
Apparently Zimmerman did not authorize his attorneys to disclose
Spaulding's medical condition. 25' Not authorized by their client, the attor-
neys respected the confidence and chose to promote Zimmerman's interests
to the fullest. In this way, the solution reached was a straightforward
application of the "autonomy" model of legal ethics.
252
3. Community
Character is the key value traceable to community, and it plays a
multi-faceted role in Spaulding. On the one hand, the integrity of the
attorneys' own character was at issue, tested by the conflicting interests of
their client and Spaulding's well-being. On the other hand, the soundness of
their professional character was also at issue in remaining loyal to Zimmer-
man. 253 Additionally, character has implications beyond this focus on self.
How these lawyers acted had influence on others - other members of the
legal community and members of society. Did these attorneys promote
autonomy to the benefit or detriment of community? How they advised
Zimmerman to exercise his rights, and how he did so, ultimately gave
expression to the content of community.
A second fundamental concept in this analysis centers on the lawyer's
obligation as an officer of the court. Ironically, no positive duty mandated
action to save Spaulding's life. Indeed, concealment of this information was
apparently permissible when the proceedings were adversary in nature. The
court found the situation more troublesome when the parties submitted
certainly tests the limits of duties of candor toward the court and fairness to opposing party and
counsel. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3; MODEL RULES Rule 3.4.
250. Pizzimenti, supra note 30, at 466, 488.
251. The case does not discuss the contents of the discussion among Zimmerman and his lawyers.
See Spaulding, 116 N.w.2d 704.
252. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
253. A lawyer's loyalty obligation to her client is a moral obligation of great significance.
McChrystal, supra note 36. "However, the moral weight of the lawyer's obligation to clients can be
overcome only by weightier moral concerns." Id. at 413. An imminent threat to life, as in Spaulding,
is reasonably such a weightier moral concern.
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their settlement to the court, however:
[Wihen the adversary nature of the negotiations concluded in a settle-
ment, [and] the procedure took on the posture of a joint application to the
Court.... the true nature of the concealment appear[ed], and defendants'
failure to act affirmatively.. . [constituted] less than full performance of
an officer of the Court's duty to make full disclosure to the Court when
applying for approval in minor settlement proceedings.
254
The court based its ruling more on Spaulding's minority than his condi-
tion, revealing its prioritization of autonomy over morality when put to the
acid test. The court thereby reflected the dominant autonomy ethos of legal
ethics.
4. Morality
Spaulding presents compelling and problematic moral concerns. There is,
of course, important moral value in preservation of confidentially and
fidelity to one's client, which Zimmerman's attorneys faithfully upheld.
Juxtaposed against these are the provocative moral questions concerning
duties to court and conscience. As to court, a key question is whether the
lawyers' concealment of Spaulding's medical condition was misrepresenta-
tion, an act inconsistent with obligations as an officer of the court.
As to conscience, Zimmerman's lawyers were tested by the knowledge of
the immediate harm threatening but unknown to Spaulding. Ethically, this
calls for a moral appraisal - of judging oneself impartially so that the
judgment reached will withstand scrutiny so as to serve as a standard of
conduct others would accept were the situation reversed. In this light, the
attorneys would have difficulty justifying their conduct.
5. Solution
When applying these conceptions to Spaulding, the central focus is solving
the problematic dilemmas that can arise in practice. These are difficult,
borderline cases which test the limits of the legal community's reasoning,
character, and judgment.
254. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d at 704, 709 (Minn. 1962). The court apparently
believed that the negligence of Spaulding's lawyer and doctor in not discovering his medical
condition, or not obtaining this information from Zimmerman, which they could have had they made
the right motions or inquiries, excused the silence of Zimmerman's attorneys. In so reasoning, the
court also apparently concluded that Zimmerman's lawyers did not run afoul of the professional
responsibility standards then in effect concerning zealousness in furthering a client's cause and
obligations of candor and fairness. Id. at 709-10. See also CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canons
15 & 22 (1908). Today, such conduct might not be treated with impunity. See MODEL RULES Rule
3.3; MODEL RULES Rule 3.4.
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Prior to evaluating Spaulding from an integrated perspective, it is worth
reviewing the contrasting approach of Zimmerman's lawyers, which was a
straightforward application of the "autonomy" model of legal ethics. In this
view, they saw their role mainly as promoting the interests of Zimmerman to
help him achieve his due in this matter, even to the exclusion of competing
duties to court or conscience.
Of course, no canon of ethics or legal obligation required them to inform
the other side of Spaulding's condition at the time of settlement, although
the law and their obligations arguably changed when they sought the court's
approval. 5 Possibly they acted on the assumption that the aneurism was
not presently life threatening. In this way, the lawyers could maximize
Zimmerman's interests in achieving a desirable settlement without regard
to consequences while still acting, technically, within the bounds of the
law. 2
56
Nevertheless, even assuming their conduct was within the law, they
undervalued competing concerns of court, conscience, and duty to Spauld-
ing in relation to Zimmerman's interests in a way that seems troubling and
distorted. In part, this is attributable to their confining solution of the case
to the one foundation of autonomy. Analyzed solely from the perspective of
autonomy, duties to court, conscience, or a third party would seem less
compelling than promotion of Zimmerman's interests. The moral world of
attorneys is thereby made simpler and less ambiguous than the moral world
of ordinary life.257 In this way, the professional role seemingly insulates
lawyers from duties to society or conscience. 8
Application of an integrated approach to professional responsibility
yields strikingly different solutions to difficult, problematic cases like Spauld-
ing. Rather than relying exclusively on any single foundation, a good lawyer
should solve problems by drawing upon all foundations, applying them in
the right proportion through careful, judicious practical reasoning. The
intent here is not to undervalue autonomy. Rather, this approach treats
255. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
256. This is an example of the "morally pernicious effect" of a certain legal realism where lawyers
intent upon realizing their clients' total autonomy
view law as a malleable commodity to be used, bent, or manipulated as needed to achieve
client goals .... All of this occurs within the bounds of the law, to be sure, but only by
redefining and stretching the limits of the law to accommodate client autonomy interests,
thus redefining society itself in the process. This process operates to transform or redefine
the terms and meaning of law so that law can take on concrete value in promoting
autonomy interests.
Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 10.
257. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. RTS. 2, 8
(1975).
258. See Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 3-4, 10-12.
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autonomy as a source of ideas from which to solve problems, along with the
other foundations of community and morality.
In the context of the case, the autonomy ideas mainly relate to promotion
of Zimmerman's interests in limiting the amount of his damages. His
primary interest is thus financial. Juxtaposed against Zimmerman's finan-
cial interest are compelling community and moral ideas.
The community ideas are related to the lawyers' integrity of character as
officers of the court in concealing the vital information concerning
Spaulding's medical condition. This concealment cannot reasonably be
considered fair play - to either the court or Spaulding. Positive obligations
to the court mandate a higher level of conduct, one more faithful to the law
and its institutions, than failing to disclose a material fact when disclosure is
necessary to avoid perpetrating what seems, in the context, a misrepresenta-
tion.259 So acting with impunity only encourages others to follow that
course. Ultimately, such conduct will undermine the administration of
justice, and, as a result, people's faith in it.
Even more compelling is the moral duty to act to save Spaulding from his
peril. The potential harm to Spaulding is disproportionately high in relation
to Zimmerman's financial interest. Nevertheless, while the value of life at
issue is paramount, it is not the only reason to act. Important countervailing
norms like preservation of confidentiality in attorney-client relations, loy-
alty to clients in zealously promoting their interests, discreetness, and good
judgment are also relevant. These norms obligate the attorneys not to
disclose Spaulding's medical condition without careful consideration, or to
do so in a manner that unduly harms Zimmerman's case.
All of this leads again to the community foundation. Resolution of the
Spaulding dilemma calls for good character and sound judgment. Persons of
good character are likely to pick out the right reason to act, and so act,
founding conduct on principled justification. Here good persons would
recognize an obligation to act in some manner to save Spaulding's life.
Of course, a professionally responsible attorney must also address the
concerns of his client. Especially relevant here is the attorney's role in
ministering to his client's needs, addressing them as human beings, not just
as right-holders. From this broader human perspective, it would be profes-
sionally irresponsible for the lawyers not to discuss Spaulding's medical
condition with Zimmerman, and its connection to him. This discussion
would, of course, include the impact of Spaulding's condition on
Zimmerman's exercise of rights. But it would also include Zimmerman's
sense of obligation to Spaulding.
It is hard to imagine how anyone in Zimmerman's situation would opt to
259. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(a)(2).
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minimize financial exposure at the cost of Spaulding's life after such a full
discussion of relevant considerations. If one did as Zimmerman, it speaks
tellingly about the content of character. In this light, Zimmerman's conduct
is an example of radical individualism, an egoistic pursuit of self-interested
ends without regard to consequences.26 ° Such conduct undermines commu-
nity.
Under the integrated approach, the focus would shift to how Zimmerman
ought to exercise his rights. His lawyers would play a vital role here in
advising how autonomy might properly be exercised consonant with commu-
nity and morality. So viewed, it is not inexorable that Zimmerman exercise
his rights so as to maximize his interests without regard to consequences.
Upon deeper consideration of the values and interests at issue, he could as
well exercise his rights, or withhold such exercise, in a manner to aid
Spaulding.
This points to the proper solution of Spaulding, one that lies in the
broader framework of legal ethics, employing all foundations. Turning first
to moral considerations, one should subject contemplated conduct to
impartial scrutiny, considering oneself as both agent and object of action.
To be credible, actions must withstand objective scrutiny so that they would
provide a principled justification for a standard of conduct others would
likewise feel obligated to follow.
Applying these standards to Spaulding, the only two choices are conceal-
ment of the information with the belief that this will promote the interests
of Zimmerman or revelation of the information, in some way, to act to save
Spaulding's life, even if Zimmerman's rights are limited. Under any moral
theory, life would predominate over financial interests. Most of us would
have serious difficulty prioritizing money over life.26 ' Indeed, were the
situation reversed, Zimmerman and his lawyers would not want their lives
valued so lightly. From an ethical standpoint, therefore, the only sensible
solution is that the imminent threat to Spaulding's life is a higher priority
compared to Zimmerman's interest in minimizing his financial exposure.
Accordingly, most people would sense a moral obligation to disclose the
information concerning Spaulding if that was the only way the harm could
be prevented.262 Good lawyers would thus ordinarily also act to save
Spaulding's life, even if Zimmerman's rights were thereby limited. In this
way, morality constrains, and directs, autonomy.
Whatever Zimmerman's lawyers do out of concern for Spaulding's well-
being must, of course, be done in a professionally responsible manner
consistent with their obligation of loyalty to Zimmerman. The above
260. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
261. See Eberle, Moral Responsibility, supra note 5, at 24-26.
262. See id. at 27-28.
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analysis demonstrates only that this one confidence should be disclosed, not
that the lawyers are abandoning Zimmerman. In fact, the lawyers are
confronting a loyalty trilemma among their duties to client, society, and
conscience."' Prudence and good sense is required to resolve this quandary
in a way that minimizes any damage to Zimmerman's case. No solution here
is easy.
In this situation, a common solution advocated to protect someone like
Spaulding, and yet skirt the prohibition against revelation of confidences, is
to place an anonymous telephone call or otherwise unobtrusively channel
one's adversary in the right direction so that the information may be
"discovered." Perhaps some other way could be found to prompt Spaulding's
doctor so he might discover the aneurysm on his own. Maybe the two
physicians could discuss the case confidentially, so that Spaulding could
learn the findings and Zimmerman's interests could be safeguarded. 64
The fact that attorneys must resort to such solutions points out certain
deficiencies in the current Model Rule on confidentiality. Under this rule, in
the absence of client consent, a lawyer may disclose confidential informa-
tion only when he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm.265 Since Spaulding's condition did not arise from
any criminal act by Zimmerman, the lawyers would not be able to reveal the
information under Model Rule 1.6. The standard likewise prohibits disclo-
sure in other compelling circumstance, like a client's disclosure that some-
one else is about to commit a crime likely to result in death or serious
physical harm, or when a lawyer learns in the course of the attorney-client
relationship that an innocent person is on death row.26 6 Reworking of the
confidentiality rule therefore seems necessary. While that topic is beyond
the scope of this article, such revision should include, at a minimum,
Professor Freedman's proposal for lawyers to disclose "when there is a
reasonable likelihood that death will occur unless the lawyer reveals the
information. '2 67 Life is certainly a higher priority than a promise of
confidentiality.
An alternative solution, consistent with Model Rule 1.6, that might also
263. For a full discussion of how to resolve such quandaries, see Eberle, Moral Responsibility,
supra note 5, at 21-37.
264. In discussing Spaulding, Professor Morgan also proposes that "a lawyer should try to find a
way to permit a doctor to disclose the findings to the plaintiff." Morgan, Thinking, supra note 141, at
454. One solution would be "to negotiate a 'use immunity' for the information. The lawyer would
make the disclosure after a negotiated agreement that it would not be admissible at trial." Id. In
short, imaginative ways need to be found to save Spaulding from his peril while protecting
Zimmerman's interests as far as possible.
265. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6.
266. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 103-04.
267. Id. at 104.
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provide the basis for a broader accommodation of the interests at issue
would be for Zimmerman or, at his direction, his lawyers, to disclose the
threat to Spaulding. This would certainly be an act of benevolence, generos-
ity, and compassion. It would also be an act of good sense and fair play.
While this might involve some sacrifice on Zimmerman's part, there might
be benefits as well. For example, in response, Spaulding might not exercise
his rights to extract the maximum penalty from Zimmerman out of genuine
appreciation for Zimmerman's brave act in limitation of his self-interest. In
short, the reward for Zimmerman's deliberate withholding exercise of rights
might be a reciprocal withholding by Spaulding. A settlement might thus be
reached that is fair and sensible. In this way, rights would have saving
graces.
Beyond Spaulding, other problematic situations can be solved satisfacto-
rily in this manner. Appropriate cases for this approach include the OPM
Leasing scandal, where lawyers failed to disclose a fraudulent business
scheme that resulted in approximately $30 million in damages; 268 the 1980s
savings and loan debacle, where bankers, with counsels' assistance, de-
frauded their depositors;269 the Ford Pinto case, where company officials
calculated the cost of safety improvements to the car in relation to lives
anticipated to be lost;270 the Buried Body case, where lawyers kept the
confidence of their client and therefore refused to disclose the whereabouts
of their client's dead victims despite entreaties from parents of a victim; 27' a
lawyer's revelation of his client's confidence in order to prevent the client's
suicide;272 and the Tarasoff situation, where the failure to disclose a
confidential communication made by a mental patient to his physicians
resulted in the death of the intended victim; 27 3 and its progeny.274 In this
way, some of the outer bounds of professional responsibility are illumi-
nated, providing direction to lawyers searching for the area within which
they ought to dwell.
CONCLUSION
Legal ethics needs to move beyond conceptualization along any single
foundation. A crucial first step is harmonization of the underlying ethical
268. In re OPM Leasing Services, Inc., Report of the Trustee Concerning Fraud and Other
Misconduct in the Management of the Affairs of the Debtor.
269. See, e.g., Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
270. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
271. People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975).
272. People v. Fentress, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1980).
273. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
274. Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (discussing a lawyer's duty of
loyalty to client overrides disclosure of information of client's mental state, which made him
dangerous to himself and others); see supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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bases to the discipline. By crystallizing the central conceptions of the
profession, a certain structure, conceptual coherence, and stability is
achieved, establishing a reliable framework to apply to the demands of
concrete cases. This also imbues the profession with a central ethical core,
illuminating the area within which lawyers ought to dwell.
Application of an integrated approach to ethics is preferable to its
foundationalist alternatives. First, lawyers can draw upon a fuller set of
ideas relevant to concrete cases rather than confining solutions to any one
foundation. Second, the approach facilitates participation of the full person
of lawyers and clients in structuring advice and ethical guidance as com-
pared to the bareness of the conventional professional relationship. Third,
attention can then shift to lawyers' (and clients') development of good
character and application of careful, imaginative, practical reasoning and
prudential judgment to concrete problems. In these ways, reliable and
sensible solutions to professional responsibility problems are more likely to
be achieved. So shifting the direction of work in legal ethics may prove
indispensable to ameliorating society's ongoing disenchantment with the
ethics of the American legal community.
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